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ABSTRACT
Every country started industrialization under different technological circumstances.
Historical account about the industrialization process of Britain, Germany, the United
States, and Japan suggests that exploring technology frontier by establishing a
differentiated institutional structure adequate for changing situation was a way for a late
industrializing country to be a new leader of the world economy.
Korea, one of the representative countries that rapidly industrialized as late as after
World War II, also suggests a new industrialization model for a late industrializing
country. Strong government involvement, strict control of financial institutions, and the
promotion of conglomerates typified the Korea's institutional structure. By aggressively
pushing exports and strategically promoting specific industries (Heavy and Chemical
industries) together with borrowing, assimilating, and modifying foreign technologies,
Korea has rapidly developed its economy until the late 1970s. During the 1980s, due to
the strong policy demand for the liberalization, deregulation, and internationalization of
the economy, the Korean government abandoned sectoral industry policy treating specific
industries and firms preferentially. Facing the changing environments, the government
focused on industry-neutral, functional industry policy. In this regard, technology policy
as a complementary measure for market failure became a new policy paradigm to sustain
Korea's industrial development. However, under the persistent culture of industry-
specific policy of the 1970s, the technology policy has more focused on the development
of targeted commercial technologies with the participation of conglomerates. The
development of technological infrastructure such as the promotion of higher educational
institutes for training capable engineers and scientists, provision of technical and marketing
information, and enhancement of small and medium size firms' technical capabilities to
vitalize the Korean economy have been delayed. In addition, too many conflicts among
technology-policy related ministries and the weaknesses of the central agency in
coordinating relevant ministries have retarded the orchestration of nationwide consensus
and policy goals. This, in turn, suggests the future policy directions to the Korean
government.
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Introduction
Technological advance is the primary means to sustain industrial competitiveness and
economic growth of a nation. Industrialization is, in fact, a process of acquiring
technological capability in the course of continuous technological change. This draw on
both opportunities and challenges for a late industrializing country. On the one hand, a
late industrializing country can exploit the latecomer's advantages. On the other, under
substantial difficulties, it should chase the rapidly moving and continuously emerging new
technological targets to catch-up with advanced countries. To enhance the international
competency of the national economy, under different circumstances, every country has
created its own peculiar industrial structure and institutional organizations during
industrialization procedures. And the scope, shape, and depth of government intervention
has differed from country to country, and from time to time.
Korea, as a late industrializing country, began industrialization after World War II,
under extremely poor circumstances. Since Korea initially had almost no indigenous
technical and financial capabilities, poor natural resource endowments, and poor
establishment of institutional organizations, the government, with ability and willingness,
held responsibility for initiating industrialization of the nation. At the early stage of
industrialization until the late 1970s, the government strongly influenced the trajectory of
industrial development while it also formulated peculiar institutional organizations and
their relationships. Since the early 1980s, as the Korean economy evolves, it has
experienced structural changes. Accordingly, the government's role has changed. Under
the demand of liberalization, deregulation, and internationalization of the economy, in
general, the government's role has been shrunk. However, the government still held, and
has tried to strengthen policy measures to facilitate technical progress. The main
objectives of this paper is to address the importance and adequacy of technology policy
for Korea to sustain its industrial development.
First, this paper reviews the theoretical analysis on the linkage between industrial
development and government technology policy. The causality between technological
progress and economic development, rationale for government intervention in
technological development, and government failure in technology policy are reviewed.
Second, this paper addresses advanced countries' industrialization procedures, their
institutional organizations, and government's role in improving indigenous technical
capabilities. The analysis covers the cases of Britain, Germany, the United States, France,
and Japan.
Third, the Korea's experience in industrialization is addressed. The inevitability of
government intervention, the adequacy of industrial policy and subsequent institutional
structure, and the evolution of technology policy are presented. Then, the adequacy of





1.1 Technological Progress and Economic Growth
Productivity growth is indispensable to growth in national income and wealth. Research
carried out over the last 30 years demonstrates that technological change is an important
contributor to productivity growth, and therefore to growth in the income and wealth of
nations. Even though the fact that technological change has been the critical variable in
accounting for the spectacular long-term growth of the western countries' economy since
the First Industrialization is one of the things that all knowledgeable people supposedly
know, it is still a difficult task to link the growing productivity to better-known facts and
landmarks of the technological history quantitatively.
This is so because to separate out the contribution of technological change from other
changes in human behavior, motivation, and social organization is an extremely
complicated methodological matter. The other reason to make the task a difficult exercise
is that technological improvement not only enters the structure of economy through the
main entrance, as when it takes the highly visible form of major patentable technological
breakthroughs, but that it also employs numerous and less visible side and rear entrance
where its arrival is unannounced, unobserved, and uncelebrated. There have been
persistent failures to observe the rush of activity through these other entrances and this in
turn accounts for much of the difficulty in achieving a closer linkage between
technological history and the productivity growth.
Rosenberg explored these neglected factors under three main issues: complementarities;
the cumulative impact of small improvements; interindustry relationship.' Rosenberg
pointed out that inventions hardly function in isolation. The productivity growth from a
technical breakthrough had to await the complementary achievements in other fields.
These complementary relationships and the hardly observable ways in which technologies
depend on one another and interact with one another make it difficult to predict the flow
of benefits from any single invention and lead to a postponement in the flow of such
expected benefits.
Rosenberg also argued that slow and often almost invisible accretion of individually
small improvements in innovations, rather than any spectacular technical breakthroughs,
constitutes the substance of much productivity improvement and increased consumer well-
being in industrial economies. There are a variety of literature to view technological
change as consisting of steady cumulating of innumerable improvements and
modifications, with only infrequent major innovations. An outsider has difficulty in
attempting to appreciate the significance of these small and innumerable technical
improvements within highly complex and elaborately differentiated technologies.
Many of benefits of increased productivity flowing from an innovation are captured in
industries other than the one in which the innovation was made. This special external
1 See Rosenberg (1982), pp. 55-80.
economy and the inability to take these interindustry relationships fully into account is a
fundamental limitation of most of the recent literature on technological innovation.
In summary, the quantitative analysis to link technological change to productivity
growth in such a high level as national economy requests the formulation of an extremely
elaborate methodology as a prerequisite, which may be far beyond the existing theoretical
framework. However, many literature based on empirical studies on specific industries as
well as Rosenberg have verified the fact that overall productivity growth would not have
been possible without the establishment of technical infrastructure providing technical
capability to invent complementary inventions and to persist small, invisible improvements
in a national level.
1.2 Technological Progress and Government
Economists have identified a number of reasons in favor of government inference in
scientific effort, technological development and use of technology. Markets fail to work
as sufficiently adequate mechanism for allocating resources to scientific and technological
effort because decisions made by firms and individuals are based on their private profits
and gains and these frequently differ from social gains.
A company or an individual may not be able to appropriate an adequate share of the
total gains to society from a discovery to compensate him for the cost of making that
discovery even though the total gains to society significantly exceed the cost of making the
discovery. The incompleteness of the patent system to appropriate proprietary technical
assets of a company leads to under investments in scientific and technological research and
development. Government's interference is justified to provide socially optimal
investment level in this regard.
The claim that risks and uncertainties associated with scientific and technological
efforts are not adequately taken into account by private groups provides another ground
for government intervention. The government involvement can counterattack risk-
aversion by private groups where this is appropriate and ensure that proper account is
taken of collective risks to society.
In addition, the imperfections in capital markets in the provision of funds for scientific
effort and technological change, social failures in the transmission of scientific and
technological information, avoidance of wasteful duplication of scientific services,
considerations of national security, and external industry-wide economies of a specific
technological development coupled with the failure of market to coordinate and direct
some large-scale desirable initiatives have supported the government's role of correcting a
global problem of inadequate private R&D. However, all these justifications of
government intervention as a complementary activity for market failure in scientific and
technological efforts entail a significant drawback of, consequently, implying that they
only focus on R&D spending level as a control variable through which governments would
affect macroeconomic productivity. The justifications need to be evaluated both
theoretically and empirically.
At the theoretical level, many economists have begun to believe that the relationship
between competition and innovative behavior is more than a matter of some tendency to
under investment or over investment in R&D. The implications for total R&D spending of
imperfect appropriability are now understood to be less clear-cut than they once seemed.
In a world of patents and industrial secrecy, firms in some instances have an incentive to
engage in duplicative R&D in an effort to copy a rival's technology or invent around its
patents. This calls into question the idea that firms necessarily engage into too little R&D.
With regard to the uncertainty issue, economists have recognized that, rather than
focusing on the amount of R&D that uncertainty is likely draw forth, what uncertainty
really demands is the exploration of a diverse set of approaches. Economists begins to
focus their attention not on the level of R&D but on the types of R&D and the portfolio of
R&D projects an industry tends to generate.2
Empirically, the OECD studies of the differences in productivity growth among
countries suggests that, in the 1950s and 1960s, the countries with the highest ratio of
R&D spending to gross national product, the United States and Britain, had among the
lowest rates of productivity growth (OECD).3 Furthermore, even during the 1970s when
developed countries experienced the ubiquitous slowdown in productivity growth,
spending for R&D continued to be high in most developed countries.
Both these theoretical and empirical studies suggests that analyzing the adequacy of
government involvement in scientific and technological efforts needs to focus on the types,
mechanism, and strategies of government R&D projects as much as R&D spending level.
1.3 Government Failure
While there may be a need for government support for science and technology, it does not
follow that government intervention will necessarily benefit the community. Just as
markets are subjected to failure so is government due to imperfections in political and
administrative mechanisms of decision-making. The complementation of problems of
2 See Nelson (1983), pp. 814-818
3 See OECD (1980)
invisible hand by visible government interaction can lead to a crucial failure due to more
invisible political mechanism.
Government policy can be distorted far away from optimal social interest by several
reasons. Government departments are in a symbiotic relationship with client groups.
Large and politically more active clients can influence the government policy in favor of
their own interests. In the democratic political system, politicians in order to obtain votes
can concentrate government support on areas where efforts more easily comes to the eye
of voters. The supposed tendency of individual government department to try to
maximize their budgets or command over resources can also lead to government failure.
Even if government departments and politicians altruistically support the social interest in
implementing science and technology policy, the difficulty of defining the social interest
and a common goal still exists, and coordination and information barriers between and
within departments as well as the finite capacity of individuals may prevent social interest
and a common goal from being efficiently pursued. Finally, bureaucrats are often even
more imperfect than company managers in the prediction of future events.
Facing with a choice between imperfect markets and imperfect political mechanisms, to
make the latter superior to the former, a society needs to recognize the inherent limitations
of political and administrative mechanisms and then, to improve them based on its




and the National Innovation System
Innovation is the use of human, technical, and financial resources to find a way doing
things. It requires experimentation with alternative approaches, many of which may prove
unsuccessful. Even fewer will survive the test of diffusion, where ultimate economic
returns are determined. Superiority at each of these levels-generating the resources
required for innovation, allowing the freedom to experiment with alternative approaches,
and providing the incentives to do so-provides a more advantageous environment for
technical innovation and economic growth to a country.4
The countries belong to advanced economies such as Britain, Germany, France, the
United States, and even Japan, became industrialized based on the development of peculiar
institutional structure different from one another. The time when a country began
industrialization strongly influenced the shape of the country's institutional structure while
the peculiar institutional structure in turn influenced the trajectory of the country's
industrialization process. The interaction between the two has shaped country-specific
environments where technical innovations were stemmed from.
4 See Rosenberg (1986).
The technical innovation system has interacted with government at a nationwide level.
The first relates to the harnessing of technological power for public purposes. Nations
have long been major consumers of new products, particularly for military use, and the
need to compete against other nations provided an important early rationale for
strengthening national technological capabilities. The second arises from the system's
dependence on its social context. The development and diffusion of advanced
technologies requires a system of education and training as a basis for supplying
technology and skills and a legal framework for defining and enforcing property rights.
These are in part public goods. The benefits of investments in education are appropriated
by a multitude of economic actors, and those of property rights are even more widely
spread. The way these public goods are provided by the government, and the role
industry plays in this respect, differs greatly from country to country due to the influence
of different institutional structure. This chapter addresses the major countries'
industrialization process, the characteristics of institutional structure, and the national
innovation systems.s
2.1 Britain
The decline of the British economy and the hardships and unsatisfactory results in
revitalizing the economy is one of the great puzzles in contemporary economics studies.
Institutional economists claim that the very institutional structure that sustained industrial
s The national innovation system can be defined as the array of public and private institutions and
organizations within an economy that fund and perform research and development, translate the results of
R&D into commercial innovations, and affect the diffusion of new technologies. Quoted from National
Innovation Systems: A Comparative Study, R.R. Nelson, ed., 1993, New York: Oxford University Press.
development in the late eighteenth century proved inappropriate to the new industries
(electricity, chemicals, and automobiles) that emerged in the 1880s and 1890s, and which
underpinned economic advance in much of the twentieth century. Britain's
industrialization was started around textiles where start-up costs were relatively low, and
this in turn resulted in the industrial structure of many, small competing firms. Since it was
easy to finance investment from retained earnings or solicitation of funds from family and
friends, joint-stock forms of corporate organization and stock markets were developed
while banks remained small and regional, with lending of small amounts at a time primarily
on a short-term basis. The banks maintained arms-length relationship with industry, no
equity share of banks in firms and no active role in firms' management, quite contrary to
the bank system of Germany and France. Britain's banks were not nationally integrated
enough to serve as major sources for finance for industrial conglomerates of the sort that
began to dominate international commerce in the late nineteenth century.
In the late nineteenth century, when new industries like electrical engineering emerged,
the long-standing dependence of industry on steam power initially limited demand for the
electrical products. Furthermore, the demand from colonies drew investment to the older
engineering sectors like locomotives, boilers, and heavy machine tools, and away from
more modem sectors. And British firms in these new sectors could not penetrate the
rapidly growing foreign markets in Germany and the United States due to the
government's protection of the markets by tariff barriers. All these resulted in over
investment in industries with slower technological change, and under investment in
industries with faster technological change and this in turn, gave rise to the slower
productivity growth of British economy in the early twentieth century.
Since Britain industrialized when the influence of craft traditions was strong, the
productive process in many industries was organized around skilled workers who often
controlled the pace of production, the work of other laborers, and the their own wage
rates. The pivotal position of skilled workers resulted in the strong and fragmented trade
union movements in Britain. Consequently managers often encountered strong shop floor
resistance to the introduction of new technology that might be more productive but entail
dome deterioration of wages and working conditions.
Because of the particular structure of British markets, the invisible market mechanism
failed to transform the efforts of individuals to maximize their own welfare into long term
benefits of all. Instead, market incentives led managers and workers to make decisions
that brought slow rates of growth and a deepening circle of economic decline.6
Britain's innovation system has several peculiar characteristics. First, with regard to its
education system, since British industrialization did not rely on mass education or formal
training of managerial or engineering personnel, until the late nineteenth century, an
education system did not exist in Britain. In contrast to Germany, the United States, and
even Japan where the organized education system was the springboard for industrial
advance, in Britain education was disorganized and lacked the strong association with the
aims of economic development. The elitist education system closely connected to the
Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, still provide country's political, economic, and
scientific elite. But the quantity and quality of education for engineers and the social
standing of engineering profession have been comparatively lower than other European
6 See Hall (1986), pp.25-47.
countries. The poverty of engineering education has constituted an important source of the
weakness in Britain's industries.
Second, recently over the past 30 years, in the procedure of government efforts to
remedy the structural problems of the British economy, the government has shown
unprecedented instability in its industrial policy. Policies have peddled between excessive
intervention and managerialism of the 1960s and the excessive disengagement of the
1980s. Actions in one period have tended to be reactions to the perceived failure of
preceding period. This is one of the vicious cycles that have made it so difficult to reverse
economic decline since the early twentieth century. Decline has engendered policy
instability which has reduced state's ability to orchestrate a sustained revival.
Third, the mission-oriented R&D system of British government has not produced
satisfactory results.7 The British system of public administration with its emphasis on
anonymity, committee decision making, and administrative secrecy, ensures that individual
public servants have little interest in orchestrating the system. The emphasis on internal
and procedural accountability also makes government reluctant to devolve major projects
7 Mission-oriented research can be regarded as big science deployed to meet big problems. It is of primary
relevance to countries engaged in the search for international strategic leadership, and the countries in
which it dominates are those where defense accounts for a high share of government expenditure on R&D
(In 1994 defense R&D accounted for 51 per cent of total government R&D budget in the United States, 36
per cent in France, and 47 per cent in Britain) Though is has also been used to meet perceived
technological needs in civilian markets, the link to national sovereignty provides its major rationale
The dominant feature of mission-oriented R&D is concentration. The decision making process is
highly centralized. The goals of mission-oriented R&D are centrally decided and clearly set out, in terms
of complex systems meeting the needs of a particular government agency. Specifying these needs and
supervising project implementation concentrate a considerable amount of discretionary power in the hands
of major funding agencies. In addition, by its nature, mission-oriented research is concentrated on a small
number of technologies of particular government strategic importance. As a result, government R&D
funding is heavily biased toward a few industries that are generally considered to be in the early stages of
technology life cycle. The scale of mission-oriented efforts limits the number of projects and participants.
At any particular time, only a small share of each country's firms, likely among the larger ones, will have
the technical and managerial resources required to participate in these programs. (See Ergas (1987)).
to reasonably autonomous entities, so that responsibilities are tangled, decision making is
cumbersome, and the organizational and cultural context is inappropriate for developing
new technologies.8
In response, recently the government tried to innovate the country's innovation system
itself. For the first time in 30 years, responsibility for coordinating all issues related to
science and technology has been given to a full Cabinet Minister. A new Office of Science
and Technology (OST) has also been set up within the Cabinet Office. It brought together
in one organization the former S&T Secretariat of the Cabinet Office and the science
branch of the former Department for Education and Science. To develop a closer
partnership between industry, academia, and government which would strengthen the
contribution of science and technology to the creation of wealth and to improving the
quality of life, the government created a new Council for Science and Technology (CST)
which replaced the Advisory Council on Science and Technology (ACOST) and ensured
that the government benefits from outside independent and expert advice when deciding
its policies and spending priorities for science and technology. Council members are senior
people from industry, academia, and research charities and recognize well the importance
of research undertaken to meet the needs of users and to support wealth creation. Then,
in 1991, the government removed the two-tier system of higher education. It enabled
polytechnics to achieve university status and placed higher education institutions on an
equal footing for funding. This policy measure may contribute to the enhancement in the
quality and quantity of British engineers. In addition, by launching special R&D
programs like the LINK initiative (1988) and the Advanced Technology Programs (1992),
8 See Ergas (1987).
the government has tried to support the collaborative research projects among companies
and science based institutions and to encourage pre-competitive research in new technical
fields.
2.2 Germany
In the literature, the Germany's industrialization is often described as an instance of the
advantages of backwardness, implying that a follower country adopting new technology
from abroad can move faster than a leader country, since the latter faces some retardation
as a result of old vintages of capital stock and the organizational resistance associated with
old technologies. 9 Germany certainly could not have industrialized as quickly as it did
without the transfer of technology from countries such as Britain. But the historical
account suggests that Germany could take the lead in some industries not because of the
advantages of backwardness, but only because it established new institutional forms that
enabled German firms to move quickly as new product areas or new processes which were
opened up by inventions and by advances in its own engineering and scientific knowledge.
The peculiar German institutional systems, rather than the British legend of invisible
market mechanisms wisely guiding the destiny of a lot of little firms who struggle blindly
with one another in the market, made it possible for Germany to achieve the great success
in the second half of the nineteenth century. The German carried out industrialization, as a
late industrializing country, through the establishment of articulated institutional system
that covered higher educational institutions, banks, industrial associations, trade unions,
and the organized government policies that deliberately rejected the excessive exercise of
9 See Ames (1973).
power in business enterprise. In the followings, the peculiarity of Germany's national
innovation system will be described by addressing institution by institution.
First, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Germany developed the
sophisticated higher educational system for science and engineering. The dual
educational system of university and the Technische Hochschulen (vocational schools)
with the emphasis more on high standard of research than on just teaching, had educated
and provided scientists and technicians who constituted a ground for Germany's industrial
take-off based on its own technical capability.
As a late industrializing country than Britain, in the early nineteenth century Germany
certainly turned to foreign countries, mainly to Britain, for new machinery and skilled
workers to bring advanced technology to its industries. British artisans were instrumental
in transferring technical know-how to Germany in machine-building and iron and steel
industries. However, to protect the technical lead of its industry, Britain prohibited by law
the emigration of skilled workers until 1824 and, for many of its advanced industries, up
to 1843 the export of machinery, including models and drawings, as well as tools and
utensils. In this situation, the mainly government-financed system for education had a key
role in the country's development. Since the early nineteenth century the German
education system had raised significant number of technicians and engineerso0 : from 1820
to 1850 Prussia trained, relative to the size of population, more technicians than France;
around the year 1880 in mathematics and natural sciences Germany educated about two
times more university students than did Italy and eight times more than France; during the
first decade of the twentieth century about 30,000 engineers were graduated in Germany
10 See Keck (1993).
compared to 21,000 in the United States; in 1913 there were about 10 times more
engineering students in Germany than in Britain. The German education system served as
stimulus for reform or for emulation in other countries like Britain, France, and the United
States. In addition, central government and federal states financed at the beginning of the
twentieth century some 40 to 50 research institutes for specialized research in applied
areas such as weather and atmosphere, geography and geology, health, shipbuilding,
hydroengineering, biology, agriculture, fishery, and forestry. In the five decades between
1860 to 1913 the government funds for higher education and scientific research increased
in real terms by a factor of about nine, from 11 million mark to 102 million mark.
Second, unlike the arms-length relationship between banks and industrial business firms
in Britain, the German banks have held intimate relationship with the industrial firms. By
participating as a board member in the Aufsichtsrat, the Supervisory Board of a company,
the German banks have influenced, supported, and supervised the management of business
firms. " Indeed, the banks have played a major tutelary role in the German industrial
system. The banks were generous in their grants of long-term credits to business firms,
and supported to the limit of their strength in the issue of shares and bonds, which were
crucial for the German industrial firms to accomplish industrialization around capital
intensive industries like electrical products, chemicals, and machinery. The banks felt that
they had a permanent stake in the businesses which they had nursed to maturity.
Furthermore, the banks led in the promotion of industrial combination and rationalization
'1 Since the early years of German industrial development, a tradition that a businessman expects his
banker to have an intimate knowledge of all phases of his business has been developed. That was also the
least that the banker expected, if he was to lend on the sometimes hazardous scale that German industry
demanded for its rapidly expanding operations. Unlike the British banks, for example, the German banks
were equipped from early in their history with technical departments whose job it was to make a judgment
on clients' requests for loans on the basis of their scientific and industrial merits.
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in key sectors such as mining, machinery, steel, and electrical products. The objects of
sector reorganization were to get rid of troublesome competition, to combine the
successive stages in the process of production, or to diminish the costs of production .12
Third, together with the banks, the industrial associations have occupied a special
position in the German economy, and contributed to the organized efforts for the
development of the economy. The industrial associations not only have represented the
interests of their member firms but also have performed an important public role, as
guardians of the long-term interests of the nation's interests. The coordination of
industrial association, which often encouraged cartelization rather than merge and
acquisitions in a specific industry, caused the relatively small size of German firms
compared to that of the US firms.
The dyestuffs, synthetic fertilizers, and pharmaceutical industries are evidence that
technological innovation, based on the country's educational and research systems, was
the key factor that enabled the industry to establish itself as leader on the world export
market. The German machine construction industry was able to free itself by the middle
of the nineteenth century from dependence on British technology in some areas of machine
construction, including steam locomotives. In many areas Britain and later the United
States had a technological lead until the end of the nineteenth century. Toward the end of
the nineteenth century, when electrical power opened new lines of machine construction
and changed the design and the manufacture of many traditional machines, German firms
were able to move to the technological front in additional areas. By 1913 Germany
accounted for 27 per cent of world production in machinery and about 26 per cent of
12 See Best (1990).
domestic production was exported. Germany held a 29 per cent of world exports,
compared with 28 per cent for Britain and 27 per cent for the United States.
As a result, although in 1870 German gross domestic product ($21 billion at 1970 US
relative price) was less than that of Britain (30 billion), the United States (30 billion), and
France (24 billion), by 1913 it was larger($72 billion at 1970 US relative price) than that
of Britain (68 billion), France (47 billion) though the United States surged ahead (176
billion).
Fourth, the institutional structure established in the nineteenth century achieved
momentum and has survived the period of the First and Second World War with growing
in size. The government cared for educational institutions as well as public research
institutions. However, the government has been hesitant in assuming responsibility for the
development of specific-technologies. In contrary to Britain, France, and the United
States, where the government intervened into the development of strategic technologies
under the so called mission-oriented technology policy regime, technology policy in
Germany has been primarily "diffusion-oriented". Clearly bound up with the provision of
public goods, the principal purpose of the policy is to diffuse technological capabilities
throughout the industrial structure, thus facilitating the ongoing and mainly incremental
adaptation to change.13 Although the German government also carried out programs for
13 The diffusion-oriented technology policies seek to provide a broadly based capacity for adjusting to
technological change throughout the industrial structure. They are, in general, characteristics of open
economies where small and medium size enterprises remain an important economic and political force
and where the state, bearing the interests of these firms in mind, aims at facilitating change rather than
directing it. The primary feature of diffusion-oriented technology policy is decentralization. Specific
technological objectives are rarely set at a central level. Central government agencies play a limited role
in implementation. Government funds tend to be fairly widely spread across firms and industries with
high technology industries obtaining a far lower share than in mission-oriented countries. These
countries view technology policy as an intrinsic part of the provision of innovation related public goods:
education, standardization, and cooperative research. (See Ergas (1987)).
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supporting the development of industrial technologies in nuclear power, aerospace, and
electric data processing, the results were unsatisfactory.
Germany today faces a problem that the German industry shows a strong technical
capability mainly in those areas where it has a long tradition of technological strength
while the industry has developed less dynamism and competence in those radically new
areas technology emerged after World War II, such as computers and microelectronics.
This problem becomes substantial as Japan has entered into those industries such as high
value-added automobiles and machinery where Germany has held distinctive
competitiveness so far. Consequently, the German government began to assume a role as
a manager of a national technical innovations, designed programs to strengthen
cooperation and flow of personnel and information between different organizations, and
fostered new institutions like Fraunhofer-Society and Max-Planck-Society. Fraunhofer-
Society is supposed to links industrial firms and higher educational institutions as well as
to provide by itself technical assistance to private firms, while Max-Planck-Society focuses
many of its activities on basic research. The splitting up of responsibility for technology
policy between the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology and the Federal Ministry
of Education and Science had created a barrier for policy makers to consider the system as
a whole until the late 1980s. And there has not been any significant change in the German
economic structure so far.
2.3 The United States
The industrialization process in the United States also had its own peculiarity. First,
industrial innovation in the US economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries largely built on an "American System of Manufacturing" and mechanical skills,
rather than on scientific research or the institutions associated with R&D. The creation of
mass-manufacturing operations of unprecedented scale, which was stemmed from the
combination of the enormous, highly protected domestic market, innovations in
transportation and communications, and the exploitation of foreign sources of knowledge
through the skilled immigrants and the import of machinery and blueprints from Europe,
supported growth in US productivity and per capita income to levels exceeding those of
Great Britain by 1913.
Second, in the late nineteenth century the United States also established higher
educational system for training scientists and engineers. Since the US system was
influenced by the successful example of Germany, the pursuit of research was recognized
as an important activity within the higher educational system. However, rather than
vocational schools in Germany, public universities were established and promoted. Since
the public universities were largely funded by state governments rather than by the federal
government, they were under some pressure to provide economic benefits to their regions.
This in turn influenced curriculum and research and therefore the US higher education in
public universities were more closely geared to commercial opportunities than was true in
many European systems of higher education. In the emerging sub-fields of engineering,
mining, and metallurgy, state university systems often introduced new programs as soon as
the requirements of the local economy became clear. An important linkage between
higher education and industrial research operated through the training by public
universities of scientists and engineers for employment of industry. Their large body of
scientific knowledge, and not merely frontier science, was relevant to the needs of an
expanding industrial establishment. 14 The Ph.D. trained in public universities also were
important participants in the expansion of industrial research employment during the early
twentieth century. Thereafter, the sheer scale of the US higher educational system meant
that this broad based system of training scientists and engineers served as a device for the
diffusion and utilization of advanced scientific and engineering knowledge. Even where it
did not advance the knowledge frontier, the higher education system was an important
instrument for scientific and engineering catch-up for the United States within
international economy before World War II, just as it has been in the postwar Japanese
economy. The rise of US scientific researchers to international eminence in a broad array
of disciplines is a postwar phenomenon and seems to have lagged behind the development
of strong US capabilities in industrial innovation as mentioned before. The modest
attainments of the US economy's scientific research establishment nevertheless did not
notably impair the nation's economic performance during the late nineteenth and first half
twentieth centuries. This suggests that the linkage between excellence in scientific research
and broader indicators of US economic performance is quite loose.
Third, big businesses, conglomerates dominated industrial development and research
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since the U.S. economy was
14 Chandler argues that to a much greater extent in the United States than elsewhere, technically trained
engineers moved into positions of industrial leadership. (See Chandler (1062) p. 317.)
developed around the capital-intensive industries, it was crucial for firms to gain the
necessary economies of scale. But this could result in the over investment and excessive
price competitions at the cost of social benefits. While Germany solved this problem
largely through the formation of cartels, which controlled investments and prices for
exploiting the best social benefits, under the influence and supervision of banks and
industrial associations, the U.S. firms could not do this due to the strict antitrust
regulations. Consequently, firms resorted to horizontal mergers to control prices and
markets, which resulted in the rise of conglomerates. At the time, the United States also
established bank-centered business groups very similar to those found in Germany. For
instance, the House of Morgan was a group that included U.S. Steel, International
Harvester, General Electric, and thirty-seven other U.S. firms.' 5 However, this system
was made illegal in the 1930s by antitrust regulations and thereafter the arms-length
relationship between banks and industrial firms has been established which is similar to
British bank systems. During this period, industrial research was dominated by the
chemicals industry and related industries. The chemicals and related industries accounted
for 40 per cent of the number of laboratories founded from 1899 to 1946, and also
accounted for slightly more than 40 per cent of total employment of research scientists and
engineers in manufacturing. This dominance was supplemented during 1921-46 by
industries whose products and process technologies drew heavily on physics. By 1946,
electrical machinery and instruments accounted for more than 20 per cent of all scientists
and engineers employed in industrial research in U.S. manufacturing, from less than 10 per
15 Historical analysis shows that firms that were part of the Morgan group had a higher rate of return than
firms that were not part of some business group. (See De Long (1989) p. 1.)
cent in 1921. Before World War II, the U.S. R&D system was dominated by industry as
both financiers and performers of R&D.
Fourth, after the World War II, the federal government assumed a central role as a
founder of both academic and industrial research. From a share of 12-20 per cent of
national R&D spending in the 1930s, federal funds expanded to account for 40-50 per
cent of national R&D expenditures during the postwar period. The U.S. federal
government's R&D policies could be typified by the dominance of defense-related R&D
expenditures and the push of "big science". In 1960 defense research constituted 80 per
cent of federal R&D funds. It declined sharply from that level and hovered around 50 per
cent level until the early 1980s, and then rose again to 65 per cent in 1990. And the
Manhattan Project's success contributed to rosy postwar perceptions of the constructive
possibilities of large-scale science for the advance of societal welfare. The sheer size of
the U.S. federal R&D funds outstripped that of other countries. Until the late 1970s, the
combined total R&D expenditures of Germany, France, Britain, and Japan did not exceed
that of the United States.
Fifth, the prominence of small firms in commercializing new technologies in the United
States after World War II contrasts with their more modest role in the interwar U.S.
economy. The postwar U.S. pattern also differs from those of both Japan and Western
Europe, where established firms in electronics, pharmaceuticals, and other industries
played a more significant role in commercializing new technologies. In semiconductors,
computers, and biotechnology industry, small firms has played a crucial role in developing,
patenting, and commercializing new technologies. This is a rather unusual phenomenon
outside the United States and several factors have contributed to the prominent role of
new, small firms in the postwar U.S. innovation system. The large basic research
establishments in universities, government, and private firms served as important sources
of scientific and technological knowledge that walked out with individuals who established
firms to commercialize the innovations based on this knowledge. High levels of labor
mobility and a relatively permissive legal climate facilitated the incubator role of
universities and large firms. The foundation and survival of vigorous new firms also
depended on a sophisticated financial system to support them during their infancy. The
U.S. venture capital market played an important role in establishing new firms in
microelectronics, computers, and biotechnology. In addition, the postwar antitrust
climate, which contributed to the development of an unrestrictive intellectual regime in
both semiconductors and computers, in which patents licensing at low royalty rates was
common and patent enforcement was relatively lax, influenced the emergence of new,
high-technology firms.'6  The military R&D as well as the military procurement under
the provisions of the Defense Production Act and Buy American provisions, which
favored U.S. over foreign suppliers, also contributed to the rise of small, entrepreneurial
firms.
Although the entrepreneurial firm was widely hailed as an important contributor to
dynamic innovative performance and as a source of national competitive advantage, in
recent years numerous observers have argued that the startup firm may have reduced the
ability of U.S. firms to compete internationally. The fragmented structure of high-
16 The 1956 settlement of the antitrust case, United States v. AT&T, significantly improved the
environment for startup firms in microelectronics. The decree mandated liberal licensing of its large
patent portfolio by AT&T, which dominated semiconductor technology at the time, and led the firm to
avoid commercial activities outside of telecommunications. Another 1956 consent decree, settling an
antitrust suit against IBM, also mandated liberal licensing by this pioneer computer firm of its punchcard
and computer patents at reasonable rates. (See Framm).
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technology industries like semiconductors, with relatively few vertically integrated firms
and a large population of merchant producers that are dwarfed by their foreign
competitors, is blamed for the competitive difficulties faced by U.S. firms. In addition, the
capital requirements of small startup firms may make their acquisition by foreign firms
easier than efforts by U.S. firms to acquire foreign-developed technologies. These
criticisms raise the possibility that this component of the U.S. national innovation system is
less well suited to an era of intense international competition and technological parity. If
the startup firm declines in importance in the U.S. high-technology industries of the future,
its role during the 1945-85 period may come to be seen as a departure from normal
patterns of innovation and evolution in market structure."
A number of factors may change the role of the startup firms in the commercialization
of technologies in the U.S. economy. Venture markets are a less important source of
support for startup firms because of the increasing costs of new product development and
the attraction of alternative investment opportunities for venture capital suppliers. The
changing public policies, especially the relaxation of antitrust policy, may facilitate the
acquisitions of startup firms by large industrial firms, reducing the likelihood that startup
firms will grow to large size as independent firms.18 Similarly, the efforts of the 1980s to
strengthen domestic protection for intellectual property may reduce the viability of startup
firms in at least one industry in which they have been very important agents in
17 See Mowery (1994).
18 The Reagan and Bush Administrations adopted a substantially more lenient enforcement posture,
arguing that international competition had significantly reduced the need for Justice Department scrutiny
of and opposition to mergers and acquisitions. Justice Department guidelines and review procedures for
mergers and acquisitions were relaxed, and major federal antitrust suits against high-technology firms
were dropped or settled in the early 1980s. In 1984, the administration supported the National
Cooperative Research Act, which reduced the antitrust penalties for collaboration among firms in
precommercial research, and in 1993 the NCRA was extended to cover joint production ventures.
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commercializing new technologies. The greatest interest by foreign firms in the
technological assets of U.S. startup firms and collaborative ventures involving startup and
established U.S. and foreign firms, which frequently focus on technology exchange and
marketing, often resulted in the acquisition of the startup firm by its established partner.
Finally, the contribution of military R&D and procurement to civilian technological
innovation appears to have declined, in the face of continuing reduction in U.S. defense
spending.
Finally, the recent U.S. government's technology policies have had noteworthy
features. The recent reorganization of technology-related agencies in the United States
provides striking evidence of the degree to which the emphasis has been placed on
technology. With the arrival of the Clinton Administration, several bodies dealing with
science and technology at the highest level have developed: the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), directed by the Scientific Advisor to the President; the
National Science and Technology Council, which has taken over the role of the FCCSET
(Federal Coordinating Committee for Science and Engineering and Technology) and
which has added decision-making powers to its consultative role. The NTSC was created
by a presidential executive order in 1993 and it consolidates the responsibilities previously
carried out by the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology,
the National Space Council, and the National Critical Materials Council. Its principal
objectives are to establish clear national goals for federal science and technology
investments and to ensure that science, space and technology policies and programs are
developed and implemented to contribute to those goals. The NTSC is chaired by the
President and includes the Vice-president. Cabinet secretaries and agency heads with
responsibility for significant science and technology programs (i.e. the Director of the
National Science Foundation, and the administrators of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and
the Environmental Protection Agency) and other key White House officials (i.e. the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Advisor, and the
assistants to the President for economic and domestic policy) are members of the NTSC.
The NTSC is undertaking an across-the-board review of federal R&D expenditures and
will prepare coordinated R&D budget recommendations for accomplishing national
objectives in areas ranging from information technologies to health research, from
improving transportation to strengthening fundamental research and international science
and technology programs. Besides this, the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act created the Technology Administration within the Department of Commerce. With
official recognition of technology as essential to economic growth has come increased
emphasis on the coordinating role of that agency. The administration's technology policy
is fostered through tax incentives, export controls, R&D investments, technology transfer,
investments in worker skills, defense conversion, and the promotion of a modern
information infrastructure. Partnerships between government, industry, and academia are
also being used to implement this technology policy. A recent example is the Partnership
for a New Generation of Vehicles, in which Technology Administration leads government-
wide efforts to collaborate with automobile makers in developing technologies for a new
generation of vehicles up to three times more fuel-efficient than today's cars. In addition
to the restructuring of government agencies related to technology policies, the U.S.
government seems to emphasize technology policies to promote industrial competitiveness
and economic growth. The government is now funding science itself with greater
prudence, as the recent abandonment of the Superconducting Super Collider project
demonstrates. Rather than performing "mega science" within the national boundary, the
U.S. government is trying to enhance international collaborative research in this field.
Ironically, the recent changes in the U.S. system may increase its resemblance to the
innovation systems of other industrial economies, especially those of Japan.1 9
2.4 France
The current national innovation systems of France is essentially a creation of the post
World War II period.20 The education sector, with its dual component - the universities
and the Grand Ecoles - dates back to the late eighteenth century but otherwise today's
institutions and mechanisms have all evolved out of those that were just the Liberation
from 1945 to 1949 and again from 1958 to 1966 during the first phase of the Fifth
Republic. The system has several characteristics that are quite specific to France: (i) the
organization and funding of the largest part of fundamental research through a special
institution, the CNRS, distinct from the higher education sector entities, which are funded
by the state and governed by scientists in an uneasy relationship with public authorities; (ii)
a dual higher education sector producing at least one type of technical senior person little
known elsewhere, namely the Grand Ecoles technical experts elite of engineers cum
19 Even as the importance of some historically unique characteristics of the U.S. national innovation
system may be declining, one sees policy debates in other industrial economies about the wisdom of
developing R&D organizations and institutions that in some respects resemble those that were long
important in the U.S. Thus, for example, Japanese policy makers and managers are considering policies
to strengthen university research, industry-financed basic research, and military financed research in ways
that may reduce the salience of some of the unique structural characteristics of the Japanese system. (See
D.C. Mowery, and N. Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth, 1989, New York:
Cambridge University Press.)
20 See Chesnais (1993).
industrial managers, cum high level of political and administrative personnel; (iii) a
pervasive element of state involvement in the production not just of general scientific and
technological knowledge, but of technology per se in the form of patentable and
immediately usable products or production processes. The French national innovation
system consists to a large extent of a set of vertically structured and fairly strongly
compartmentalized sectoral subsystems often working for public markets and invariably
involving an alliance between the state and public or private business enterprises belonging
to the oligopolistic core of French industry.
During the nineteenth century, when Germany and the United States fiercely caught up
with Britain under their own technological capabilities based on sophisticated higher
educational system and pioneering new technologies, France's industrialization was
handicapped by a combination of several reasons. First and the most importantly, the
educational system failed to provide needed engineers for industrialization. The Grand
Ecoles, the professional school supposed to provide a ground in engineering and science,
has raised experts, civil servants, and managers for a particular ministry, rather than
research engineers who could make substantial advances in the state of the art. Therefore,
in contrast to the German Technische Hochschulen, the French mode of engineering
school had lacked in general spirit of modem scientific research even until the early
twentieth century. In addition, the discrepancy between science and industry is clear
because of the almost total absence of the industrial R&D laboratories developed from the
1890s onward in Germany and the United States and so a weak French position in
science-push industries. By contrast, in sectors where technological development took the
form of pragmatic, step-by-step innovations as in automobiles and aeronautics, French
inventors and entrepreneurs were very active. Up to World War II the French automobile
industry was the second largest world producer.
Second, since demographic growth was very weak and the peasantry-dominated
economic structure offered a very limited demand for industrial products, domestic
demand was not inherently dynamic. And in contrast with Britain, French industry was
not faced with any large external demand but it did nothing to create it until later it
accepted without much difficulty a very reactionary approach to the management of
colonial possessions. The small and rather conservative businessman is largely a natural
outcome of this overall situation. Consequently, industrialization came about in
successive bursts on the basis of exogenous market pull in the form of government
guaranteed and bank financed demand, notably for railroad building, ships, and arms.
Third, since World War II, the French economy has followed a pattern of state-led
growth. Consequently, the government held a critical role in developing institutions for
technological innovations. The government and the oligopolistic core of large public and
private firms operating in the high-technology sectors typifies the current French
institutional structure. Especially, the government established research agencies in
strategic technology sectors to develop technological strategies, to prompt technological
development, and to supervise R&D procurement. For instance, CEA in nuclear power,
CNET in telecommunications, CNES and ONERA in aerospace, and DRET in defense
electronics are established for this purpose. Together with the promotion of national
champion firms and the establishment of particular research agencies in strategic
industries, the French government has focused on the development of strategic
technologies. In this regard, the France's technology policy could be considered as
"mission-oriented". However, the French system has resulted in structural problems. The
emphasis on hierarchy, the difficulty of cooperating, the antagonistic relationships between
management and workers, together with the particular rigidities of state-led system have
eroded the industrial competitiveness of France. Except for pharmaceuticals and
aerospace, the French industry has shown structural deficiencies.
During the 1980s, in response to the structural problems, the French government has
implemented several noteworthy policies, which were more like diffusion-oriented in that
the policies aimed at facilitating the training in higher educational institutions or
strengthening the technical capabilities of small and medium size firms (SMF). Such
programs like 'Industrial Training through Research Agreements (CIFRE), Training
Agreements for Higher Technicians (CORTECHS) were introduced to prompt doctoral
training. The Ministry of Research and Higher Education, through intensive discussions
with industry and academia, established a plan to encourage the SMF to use technological
resources for enhancing their competitiveness. The plan included several policy measures:
to strengthen incentives to recruit staff (technicians, engineers or researchers) who could
be pivotal between research and the SMF's other activities; to develop technology support
points at which SMF could consult a technology development counselor about problems
and receive guidance about who might be the right potential partner to approach.
2.5 Japan
Japan represents another peculiar model for accomplishing industrialization. Although
Japan's industrial development, to a greater extent than Germany and the United States,
depended on borrowing and assimilation of foreign technologies, it is much more different
from other Asian countries that shared similar tradition and culture with Japan, in that it
started industrialization and established modem institutional structure much faster than
those countries. By the mid-1910s many firms had been established in heavy industries
including steel, machinery, and chemicals and therefore the Japanese economy already
took off around the time of World War I. Japanese paradigm for industrialization can be
described as follows.
First, Japan's own indigenous technical capability started to be established in the late
nineteenth century. In 1883 Japan already established a modem higher educational
institute of Kogakuryo (the college of Engineering) with the advice of a British engineer,
H. Dyer, which later in 1886 became the Engineering Department of Imperial University
(later renamed the University of Tokyo). Quite unlike the British system, the university
education emphasized the interaction between classroom studies and on-site training at the
laboratory works within the university. It is noteworthy that the Japanese government
emphasized engineering education at the time when more developed countries regarded
pure science as superior to engineering. The university produced educates who later
founded many of major Japanese manufacturing firms. Thereafter more universities and
vocational schools were established by the public as well as the private sector. During the
early twentieth century until 1930, 38 public research institutes were founded by the
government. In 1923 there were 162 private R&D laboratories affiliated with companies,
cooperatives, and other private foundations. Of these 71 were in chemicals, 27 in metals
and machinery, and 24 in food although most of them were small and include testing and
development sections within factories which may not deserve to be called laboratories in
the present sense.21 In 1930 national R&D expenditures accounted for about 0.2 per cent
21 See Odagiri (1993).
of the GNP and this increased to 1 per cent in 1942. These increased R&D activities
enabled some of the Japanese manufacturing industries to start world-class production
facilities and developing advanced products; for instance, large-scale furnace and open
hearth for steel production, aircraft, ships, alloys, and communication equipment.
However, even these industries depended on European and U.S. technologies in many
aspects. The stoppage of technological inflow from abroad during World War II had a
serious impact, and consequently, despite the increased domestic R&D efforts, the
technological gap from the Western countries widened in such key industries as aircraft
and shipbuilding.
Second, as of the firm structure, Japan's industrialization started by industrial groups,
Zaibatsu, in the early twentieth century, and accomplished by industrial groups, Keiretsu,
in the second half of twentieth century. Keiretsu is different form Zaibatsu, in that
individual group firms are more loosely linked to one another through the small amount
of cross-ownership while the member firms in Zaibatsu are more tightly linked through the
ownership of its founder and family members.22 However, the industrial group, whether
it is Zaibatsu or Keiretsu, with the structure of highly diversified into unrelated businesses,
surrounded by a network of smaller suppliers, under the support and supervision of a
commercial bank, which is also a member of an industrial group, dominated the Japan's
industrial development throughout the twentieth century. This organizational mode of
firms has helped the development of the Japanese economy. First, the intense competition
among industrial groups encouraged early entry into new markets. Then, the financial
22 Unlike the Zaibatsu, as a group, Keiretsu members have the advantages (size and coordination) of being
a conglomerate with minimizing the disadvantages (excessive centralization and inefficiency) of being a
conglomerate. (See The Economist, February 2, 1991, p. 63.)
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capability of the industrial group made strategic, long-term commitments for specific
business possible and this in turn enabled market share competitions and productivity-
enhancing investments in firm-specific skills. Finally, each group, as it moved to new
business areas, sought to shift its suppliers with it.
Third, especially after the World War II, the government played a key role in the
rehabilitation of the Japanese economy by efficiently supporting and coordinating the
Japanese firms. Japan entered the 1950s with an strong economic bureaucracy able and
willing to deploy an active strategy for industrial transformation and development.
Compared to the present day, the bureaucracy was at the time powerful relative to other
institutional actors. Despite the devastation of the production facilities during World War
II, the Japanese economy regained the prewar peak production level in manufacturing
industry within 5 years, and thereafter grew at an annual rate of approximately 10 per cent
until the early 1970s. It is true that the technological base accumulated since the early
twentieth century and the favorable international economic environment provided a
ground for the rapid economic growth. However, the government's industrial policy -
especially the MITI's role in export expansion and targeted industrial promotion,
facilitation of technology diffusion among domestic firms through the control of
technology importation and collaborative R&D activities -, was a crucial factor for this
rapid revitalization of the Japanese economy. During the early 1970s, as Japan became a
world-class competitor in the international market, the technology importation became
less favorable and therefore, the government began to emphasize technology policies to
promote domestic R&D capabilities. The government provided packaged incentives
through tax breaks, subsidies, and low-interest loans to promote private firms' R&D
efforts. However, interestingly, the size of the incentives were much smaller than that of
other advanced countries including the United States, Germany, France, and Britain. In
1965 the amount of the government support accounted for 6.3 per cent of industrial R&D
expenditures and this ratio reduced to just 3.1 per cent in 1980. Given this modest
government policy measures, it is often argued that most of the R&D projects which the
government supported would have taken place anyway. However, rather than this
argument, it may be more cautious judgment that the Japanese government, within the
peculiar Japanese culture and institutional structure, could more efficiently orchestrate the
nationwide R&D efforts with much smaller amount of incentive packages than other
advanced countries did. Indeed, the government's industrial policy has been judged as
market-conforming, which means the government has seldom picked winners and losers.
The industrial development strategies have been industry-led strategies where government
was a participant rather than a dictator. Private firms could reject government initiatives
as shown in the auto manufacturers' rejection of a consolidation plan of the MITI in the
1960s. The principal goals of Japanese government's industrial policy have been to focus
on those industries with high rates of growth in productivity, high income elasticity of
demand, and high value added per employee to sustain the economic development and
high wage economy.
Fourth, one policy measure that has attracted considerable interest is collaborative
R&D efforts especially under the support and supervision of the MITI during the 1960s
and 1970s. MITI officials, in their public pronouncements and interviews, stress the
necessity of pooling R&D efforts in order to make the most efficient use of scarce
scientific manpower and research funds.23 Japanese system may be viewed as important
components of a technology adoption policy, in a sense that the projects had focused less
on advancing the scientific or technological frontier than on diffusing advanced technology
among participants. However, with regard to this viewpoint, several drawbacks in MITI's
joint research policies have been notified. It is doubtful whether the coordination of the
MITI to exchange technological information among participants was effective and
successful. Among 87 joint research projects, executed during 1961-1987, only two
projects had joint research facilities, and in all other cases, each member firm simply took
its share of research funds and carried out the research in its own laboratories.24 Given
that each firm inevitably tried to minimize the disclosure of its proprietary technologies in
this situation, and that the MITI, which was involved in crucial struggle with the Ministry
of Communication to grip the hegemony in technology policies around information
industry, also had a motivation to shape the collaborative R&D projects without articulate
evaluation, the effectiveness of this coordination system of diffusing technology among
participants needs to be evaluated more precisely.
Finally, nowadays, the Japanese government is attaching increasing importance to the
provision of funding for stimulating and internationalizing the creativity of its basic
research system, showing less concern over industrial competence. This is quite contrary
to other advanced countries like Britain, the United States, and France which have tended
to more emphasize technology goals of increasing its industrial competence. This has
been resulted by both the international criticism of Japan as "a free rider" in basic
23 See Yamamura (1993).
24 See Odagiri (1993).
technology and Japan's own recognition of the need for basic technology as a seed to
further its technology frontier.25 In addition, the government is emphasizing the
international cooperation in R&D activities by participating such programs as the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and the Space Station
Program, and by launching Japanese Fellowship Programs.26
2.6 Summary of Chapter
As a summary, Table 2-1 represents the peculiar features of the advanced countries in
their institutional structure and government's role around their industrialization. As
discussed in above sections, each country developed its own economic institutions and
innovation systems. However, as economic environments changed, the strength of a
country's unique system has resulted in weakness in new circumstances. Therefore,
recently, the innovation systems and institutional structures of a country has more and
more increased its resemblance to those of other countries.
25 Negotiations over renewal of the U.S.-Japan Agreement on Scientific Cooperation, U.S. and Japanese
participation in the Intelligent Manufacturing Systems projects, and Japanese contributions to the U.S.
based Superconducting Supercollider all have been affected by the concerns of U.S. policy makers that
Japanese public agencies and firms do not contribute to the global pool of scientific knowledge in
proportion to the economic benefits that they derive from it.
26 The ITER project is an international collaborative program jointly undertaken by Japan, the European
Union, the United States, and the Russian Federation in order to demonstrate the scientific and
technological feasibility of fusion energy for peaceful purposes. The Space Station Program is and
international project conducted by the United States, member nations of the European Space Agency
(ESA), Canada, and Japan under an Intergovernmental Agreement. This program is the principal step to
manned space activities of long duration. And the Japanese Fellowship Programs were established in 1988
to invite foreign researchers to carry out research in Japan. Approximately 210 foreign researchers were
accepted by Japanese national research institutes and public research organizations under this program in
1993.










































































































As shown in Chapter 3, Germany and the United States started industrialization under the
British hegemony of the world economy. Although both countries also relied on
borrowing technologies from Britain, they became world industrial leaders by generating
pioneering technologies in newly emerging industries. It was possible since those two
countries established peculiar institutional structures different from British systems, and ,
under the institutional structures, they could exploit late comer's advantages and build
indigenous technical capabilities exceeding Britain in emerging industries. They either
invented new products and processes or were first to commercialize them on a
unprecedented large scale.
By contrast, Korea's industrialization during the past three decades depended on
technical learning form advanced countries. Since Korea initially held very poor technical
capability, until recently before Korea emerged as a potential international competitor in
some industries, the Korean economy has developed by borrowing, assimilating, and
improving foreign technologies that has already been commercialized by experienced firms
from advanced economies.27 Even though Korea held the comparative advantage in wage
levels, the low wages could not solely be an sufficient asset against the higher productivity
levels of more advanced countries. Given the inadequacy of low wages and the absence of
pioneering technology, governments inevitably intervened. The Korean government, rather
than passively remedied for institutional shortcomings or market failures, actively
formulated nationwide economic development plan and influenced the formation of the
Korea's institutional structure. 28 However, the Korean government's policy has evolved
continuously in the scope and extent to which the government intervenes into the market
according to changing environments.
During the early period, from the Liberation in 1945 to the late 1970s, it may be safe to
assume that the government initiated the industrial development of Korea. The
government provided comprehensive incentive packages to induce firms to invest into
export-businesses (1960s) and strategic heavy and chemical industries (1970s).29 In
particular, the Heavy and Chemical industry Promotion Plan provided domestic firms,
especially conglomerates with a ground to directly confront with the world-class firms
from advanced economies in such capital-intensive, high-risk industries like shipbuilding,
automobiles, and, a little later in the 1980s, semiconductors. Since those industries hardly
fell into Korea's comparative advantage of the time, the government back-up was a
27 See Amsden (1989).
28 See Fishlow (1987).
29 Policy instruments for promoting Korean industry are as follows: targeted and subsidized credit
allocation; protection of domestic import substitutes, firm-specific export targets and subsidies; financial
support of government-owned banks, development of export marketing institutions, wide sharing of
information between public and private sector; cartel rationalization against antitrust regulation,
preferential government procurement toward domestically developed new products; public investment in
applied research, and tax benefit package (See World Bank (1993)).
prerequisite.30 The unyielding spirit of a leader, President Park, provided a ground
around which the Korean government pursued industrial policies consistently and
persistently.3 1
However, since the early 1980s, the circumstances have changed and there arose a
strong demand for structural adjustment of the Korean economy. The main thrust of the
demand could be characterized by liberalization, deregulation, and internationalization of
the economy on the perception that further heavy government intervention would be
neither desirable nor effective in light of the already sophisticated and large-sized Korean
economy. The increasing pressure from advanced countries to abolish the industry-
specific policies and to open domestic markets has also changed the directions of the
government policies. In addition, as Korea gradually entered into high-wage economy,
Korea needed to go upscale in technology to the higher-productivity activities that can
support the high-wage economy. This required massive investments in technology, skills,
and infrastructure together with an aggressive efforts to raise productivity. However,
getting the technology necessary to move upscale was difficult. Easy access to
technologies from advanced countries became a thing of the past. The U.S. firms began to
guard their technologies more carefully and demand much bigger license fees. The
Japanese firms were also reluctant to transfer technologies in a fear of boomerang/flying
geese effects as the Korean firms emerged as potential competitors in the international
markets.
30 See Amesden (1994).
31 Don't listen to "comparative advantage" advice. Whenever we wanted to do anything, the advocates of
comparative advantage said, "we don't have comparative advantage." In fact, we did everything we
wanted, but whenever we did, we did well. - President Park-, (See Alagh (1989)).
Under the circumstances, in the mid-1980s, the Korean government started to view
science and technology as indispensable to sustain the country's economic development
and its competitive position in international trades. The government aims to increase
R&D expenditures to 3 to 4 per cent of GNP by 1996, equal to or exceeding the share in
Germany, Japan, and the United States, and well above the OECD median of. By 2000,
Korea's supposed goal is to compete with the major industrial powers in areas ranging
from pharmaceuticals to high-definition television. The question is "how?"
3.1 Initial Conditions: 1950s
The primary concern for Korea in the 1950s was rehabilitating the infrastructure and
manufacturing capacity that was virtually destroyed by the Korean War (1950-1953).
Korea held low level of technological capability and knowledge stock, lack of human
resources, negligible science and technology investment, and inefficient science and
technology development systems. In 1948, Korea had only one university that had a
school of engineering, some engineering colleges, public research and test centers. There
were only 100 scientists and 1,000 technicians. During the 1950s per capita income
remained at a level of $60 to $70, placing Korea among the poorest countries in the
world. Primary industry and the services industry accounted for about 85 per cent of the
total output. The services industry comprised the highest ratio, 40-50 per cent, mainly
attributable to a large number of less skilled workers hidden in retail and other services
industry that did not require expertise. The primary industry output was also high at 47.3
per cent in 1953, with this percentage being maintained until the mid-1950s and thereafter
declining slightly. During this period, two-thirds of exports were traditional products and
primarily crude materials such as unprocessed minerals. However, elementary and
secondary school enrollment in Korea outstood compared with other less developing
countries of the time. This will be discussed in detail later.32
3.2 Export-Push and Diversification: 1960s-1970s
In 1962 Korea adopted its First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the first
systematic long-term economic development plan in Korea.3 3 One of the most salient
features of the Development Plan was to regard exports as the locomotive of growth, with
a large part of government policy efforts being put on the promotion of exports. A lot of,
noteworthy policy measures were undertaken for the promotion of exports. The
government provided tax, tariff, and financial incentives to exporters. Korean currency,
won, was devaluated to enhance the price competency of export products. 34 A very
complicated exchange rate system was revamped into a simpler unitary exchange rate
system. In addition, in 1967 the government shifted the import control system from a
positive list system to a negative list system, to lessen the difficulties of exporters in
importing necessary intermediate materials and capital equipment for producing exportable
goods. From 1962 to 1970, total export increased 18-fold from $50 million to $8.4
hundred million while imports also sharply increased, reflecting the rapidly increasing
32 See p. 56.
33 During the 1962 to 1992, seven Five-Year Economic Development plans were executed continuously.
However, in 1993, by the newly elected President Kim's Administration, further execution of the Five-
Year plan was abolished on the grounds that this kind of centralized planning would not be adequate for
the further development of the Korean economy. Instead, the new Administration planned and
implemented "the New Economic Development Plan", emphasizing the "small but powerful, efficient
government".
34 During the 1950s, won was mostly overvalued. In the 1960s, the currency was devaluated. The most
dramatic devaluation came in 1964 when won was devaluated by almost 100 per cent from 130 won per
US dollar to 255.77 won per US dollar.
demand for intermediate materials and capital goods to support dynamic capital formation
(Table 3-1).
TABLE 3-1: The Development of the Korea' International Trade
(unit: hundred million $, %)
GNP Exports Imports Total Trade Exports/GNP Total Trade/GNP
1962 23.0 0.5 4.2 4.7 2.4 20.6
1970 81.0 8.4 19.8 28.2 9.9 34.6
1980 605.0 175.1 222.9 398.0 28.9 65.8
1990 2,22.0 650.2 698.4 1,348.6 26.8 55.7
Source. Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Year Book; National Statistical Office, Major
Statistics of the Korean Enonomy, various issues.
In addition, Korea's economic structure changed rapidly. The trade ratio (a combined
ratio of exports and imports as a percentage of GNP) rose sharply, from 20 per cent in
1962 to 34 per cent in 1970. There was also a large change in industrial structure, with
the portion of primary industry declining in total output, while manufacturing and services
picked up. Accordingly export structure also became increasingly dependent upon
manufacturing goods, mostly light industrial products such as textiles and footwear.35
In the 1970s, the Korean economy experienced significant changes in trade, industry,
and finance. The 1970s began with tremendous changes in financial markets, particularly
money and capital markets. In 1972, with the promulgation of the Presidential
Emergency Decree, the government declared that all borrowings by business corporations
from unofficial financial markets would be subject to a payment moratorium.36 With this
measure, the government intended to reduce the debt burden of the business firms in order
35 In 1972 light industrial products accounted for 75 per cent of Korea's total exports. The share was
about 40 per cent in 1965.
36 At that time, largely because of underdevelopment of official financial markets and government
intervention interest rate determination in official financial markets, unofficial curb markets were
flourishing. Business firms heavily relied upon curb market where loan rates were very high and business
practice was not organized. This caused aggravation of the financial status of business firms. Under the
circumstances, the government promulgated the Decree which was unusual and extraordinary.
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to boost their production and investments. The Investment and Finance Companies were
established to undertake short-term dealings in commercial paper issued by business
companies. Financial reforms continued throughout the 1970s including the 1972 creation
of corporate bond market.
The next policy move was to develop the heavy and chemical industries (HCI). In the
1960s, the light industry (textiles, footwear, small appliances) had grown rapidly, playing a
key role in boosting exports, generating employment and increasing national output.
However, there were inevitable reasons for Korea to drive HCI promotion. Korea might
lose its price competitiveness in light industrial products to other developing countries,
especially the Southeast Asian countries where labor wages were much lower and similar
export-oriented economic development were pursued. In addition, Korea needed to
develop export substitutes for light industrial products which faced increasing import
protections from advanced countries after the first oil shock. The light industry oriented
industrial structure created a relatively small amount of added value due to its heavy
reliance on imported raw and intermediate materials. Along with this disadvantage,
increased investments in the light industry expedited the import of capital goods, which
aggravated the balance of payments. Therefore, to address these potential problems, in
1973 the government announced the Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) Development
Plan. The HCI plan outlined the need, scope, and implementation program for developing
strategic industries, including shipbuilding, automobiles, steel products, machinery, nor-
ferrous metals, electronics, and petrochemicals. To promote the HCI, the government
provided varied incentives to the firms which initiated HCI projects. However, at this
time, the incentive system was totally different from those to be provided to promote
exports. While the incentives to exporters were industry-neutral in that all industries or
firms were treated equally, the incentives for promoting HCI were industry-specific and
sometimes firm-specific as well. The strategically targeted industries (consequently firms)
were provided with preferential credits.37 Entry into certain areas of heavy and chemical
industry was controlled by the government to achieve the needed economies of scale for
international competition. In fact, during the HCI promotion drive, import restrictions on
targeted infant industries were intensified mainly through the high tariff barriers to protect
these industries from competition with imported products from advanced economies. An
empirical study suggests that this previous period of import substitution was an inevitable
prerequisite for the successful adoption of export promotion in HCI.3 8 The noteworthy
point is that Korea was much faster than other late industrializing countries, especially
Latin American NICS, in shifting to the phase of HCI exports. In this regard, throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean government were continuously encouraging exports
while protecting infant industries; therefore, to merely characterize Korea's HCI
promotion period as a classic import substitution experiments is incorrect.
All these efforts of the government substantially contributed to rapid development of
the heavy and chemical industries. The share of heavy and chemical industries in the total
output of manufacturing sector rose from 29 per cent in 1970 to 51 per cent in 1980, and
to 60 per cent in 1989. The value-added share of HCI in manufacturing industry also rose
37 As for the financial incentives, the government established the National Investment Fund which
provided long-term loans to strategically selected heavy and chemical industries to help finance their
capital formation. While the Fund was partly funded by the government source, much of it was funded
through a compulsory transfer of private deposits from the commercial banking institutions to the Fund.
Real interest rates on preferential credits or policy loans for the sector were mostly negative. These
industries held a privilege in accessing to bank loans during the credit rationing. Consequently almost 60
per cent of total bank loans went to HCI sectors during the HCI promotion period.
38 See Gereffi (1990).
from 36 per cent in 1970 to 51 per cent in 1980. In addition, HCI accounted for 36 per
cent of employment in manufacturing industry in 1980 rising from 26 per cent in 1970.
This share rose to 55 per cent in 1989 (Table 3-2).
TABLE 3-2: Structural Change in Manufacturing Industry
(unit: %)
Year Light Industry HCI
Total Output 1970 70.5 29.5
1980 48.4 51.6
1989 39.6 60.4
Value-added 1970 64.0 36.0
1980 48.6 51.4
1989 39.4 60.6
Employment 1970 74.2 25.8
1980 63.6 36.4
1989 44.7 55.3
Source. Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables, various issues.
Accordingly, exports in HCI increased during the 1970s. In 1977 the share of HCI
exports in Korea's total exports was 39 per cent, rising from 12 per cent in 1967.
Electronics, machinery, ships, and iron and steel products were leading export products of
the time.
3.3 Changing Environments and Structural Adjustment: 1980s-1990s
Given the prevail poverty and widespread unemployment, the growth of the nation's
economy had been a kind of national motto throughout the 1960s and 1970s. And this
"growth-first strategy" had constituted a basic philosophy for Korea in aggressively
pushing exports and actively promoting HCI during the early stage of industrialization.
However, while the strategy had contributed to the rapid development of the Korean
economy, it also resulted in potential problems. It caused an excessive demand situation,
high inflation, and accumulation of foreign debt.3 9 More explicit, in the early 1980s, most
of firms in the HCI were suffering the excess supply capacity and under utilization and this
in turn resulted in enormous business loss and heavy debt-service burden. The
government's aggressive promotion of HCI, anyway, constituted a primary cause of these
problems. In addition, the second oil shock and the subsequent world economic
slowdown aggravated the problems of over investment and under utilization for most
firms in targeted HCI.
Under the circumstances, in a belief that the heavy government intervention would not
be desirable for furthering the economic development, liberalization, deregulation, and
internationalization became a norm of the Korean government's policy direction, replacing
the past industry-specific policies. The government took several important steps toward
deregulation and internationalization of the economy. First, to open domestic markets and
to stimulate competition in the economy, it reduced import barriers to a considerable
extent by lowering tariff rates and increasing the numbers of importable items without any
authority's approval. The average tariff ratio was down to 20 per cent in 1985 from 39
per cent in 1978 while the import liberalization ratio, i.e., the percentage of the importable
items without prior approval in the total commodity items classified for custom use, rose
from 68 per cent in 1979 to 92 per cent in 1985. Next, financial incentives given to export
industries and the HCI were reduced dramatically to heighten the self-sustaining capability
of these industries. In fact, policy-based loans had occupied a substantial portion of total
domestic credit. This brought about a distorted allocation of financial resources, impairing
39 The increase in rate of consumer price index reached 16-17 per cent annually in the 1970s, and
outstanding external debt expanded from $2.3 billion in 1970 to $27.2 billion in 1980. A fast increase in
foreign debt since the mid-1970s to finance active investment in the HCI apparently led to a sharp
increase in the debt service burden.
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the independent operation of commercial banks and preventing flexible monetary policy.
Together with a drastic reduction of financial incentives, liberalization of financial sector
was initiated through privatization of the five commercial banks and the lowering of
barriers set against foreign banks' entry into the Korean financial markets. Another
important change in macroeconomic policies in the mid-1980s was to emphasize the
stabilization of the economy, compared with the previous policy in the 1960s and 1970s,
which had focused on economic growth. Money supply had kept a high growth rate in the
1970s and early 1980s; however the growth rate in M2 sharply declined from 1983
onwards. In addition, the government spending was cut, leading to a dramatically lowered
budget deficit ratio as a percentage of GDP. Along with this tight monetary and fiscal
policy, inflation came down from a double digit rate to less than 5 per cent from 1983
onwards. In addition, in microeconomic policy, the government abandoned industry-
specific policies by abolishing seven industry-specific promotion acts, such as the
Electronics Industry Promotion Act. Subsequently the government enacted the Industrial
Development Act in 1986. Under this act, some of government interventions including
permissions, approvals, and instructions were eliminated and the government pushed
forward to develop industrial technologies to cope with the changing situation.
The structural adjustment and stabilization efforts in the 1980s were thought to be
successful. Since the mid-1980s, the Korean economy had demonstrated dramatic price
stability and huge surpluses in the current account, while maintaining high-growth
momentum. From 1986 to 1988, exports began to increase by about 30 per cent per year,
resulting in large trade surpluses. Several factors accounted for these sharp increases in
exports. First, a radical appreciation of the Japanese yen occurred in 1985, corresponding
to the Plaza Accord of the Group-7 countries. The appreciation played an important role
in improving the international price competitiveness of certain Korean products, steel,
cars, electronic consumer durable, and semiconductors, which were competing with
Japanese products in the international markets. The second factor was the improved
quality of Korean manufacturers, ascribed to technological development, research and
development efforts and government's support for the HCI in the 1980s, which stimulated
production of new exportable goods.
However, the rapid increase of real wages since the late 1980s drew on imminent, new
challenges to the Korean economy.40 Until then, Korea had basically relied on the
comparative advantage of low labor costs, than on technical or marketing competitive
assets in international trades. Therefore, the rapid wage increase which exceeded the
productivity growth rate caused the erosion of the international competitiveness of the
economy. Korea still lacks in technical and marketing competency for competing against
advanced economies in high-end products. But Korea has rapidly been caught up with by
the South East Asian countries in low-end products. Because of the sharp Yen
appreciation following the Plaza Accord, the Japanese firms rapidly shifted manufacturing
facilities into the South East Asian countries. The combination of low labor costs of the
region and high-technology and the sophisticated quality control systems of the Japanese
firms threatened the Korean economy seriously. How to overcome this circumstances and
40 The average monthly real wage in Korea's manufacturing industry was $941 in 1991, much bigger than
in such countries where per capita income is higher than Korea like Singapore ($898), Taiwan ($918),
and Hon Kong ($781). From 1988 to 1992, real wage in manufacturing industry increased 11.2 per cent
per annum in Korea, compared to 3.9 per cent in Hon Kong and 8.1 per cent in Taiwan. Two factors
caused the rapid increase of Korea's wage: one is the rapid progress of democratization since 1987
Presidential election and subsequent emphasis of employee welfare; the other is the shortage of work
forces due to the rapid expansion of the Korean economy until the mid-1980s. The latter, the shortage of
work force, drew on more impact on the wage increase.
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how to enter into more high value-added, high-technology industries have been major
tasks for Korea to further its economic growth since the late 1980s.
3.4 Late Industrialization Paradigm of Korea
3.4.1 Noteworthy Features in Korea's Industrial Development
Favorable Initial Conditions in Education and Income Equality
Regarding initial conditions that preceded economic take-off, Korea clearly stood out in
educational attainment and income equality before its performance started to diverge from
other less developing countries. In the case of Korea, the indicator for education judged
by primary and secondary school enrollment and literacy ratio, and the indicator for
income and land distribution evaluated by gini coefficients, were outstanding among East
Asian and Latin American developing countries.4 1 In particular, the successful land reform
carried out in the late 1940s leaded to favorably equal wealth distribution and political
stability where the subsequent economic development plans could be built on with
consistency. The favorable educational situation, later, provided a ground for efficient
transfer of advanced technology from abroad, more productive investment, establishment
of efficient business management, and capable public administration to be achievable.
A sufficiently equal income and land distribution can be argued a prerequisite for
industrialization. In societies where inequities are large, there will be more pressure to
redistribute income and wealth, and this pressure in turn results in various kinds of
redristributive policies that are harmful to private investment and to growth. This can
results in policy instability and distrust of firms in government policies. Considering that,
41 See Rodrik (1994).
in Latin America, educational achievement was comparatively low and government
policies often proved to be unstable and switched to another set of policies due to the
pressure from middle class aiming for equal income and land distribution, it can be a
reasonable hypothesis that the favorable initial conditions of education and income and
land distribution are causally linked to Korea's subsequent remarkable performance.
Control of Financial Institution and Credit Policy
In 1961 the government nationalized private commercial banks.42 In addition, the
government established a number of state-owned special banks and expanded existing
specialized state-owned banks. In 1962 the government amended the Bank of Korea Act
to facilitate the central bank's cooperation with the nation's long-term development
efforts. Since then until 1980, the government held complete control over Korea's bank-
dominated, formal financial system. As an owner-manager, the government hired
personnel and determined budgets and credit ceilings for all commercial banks. Even since
the privatization measures of the 1980s, the government still sets interest rates, rations
policy loans, allocates operating funds, and chooses the banks' top personnel. As a result,
the Korea has been described as a country that "exhibits the most extreme case of banks'
dependence upon the state.43
Korean monetary authorities have relied primarily on direct control for implementing
monetary policies. The most essential of these direct controls has been the government's
ability and willingness to set interest rates at artificially low levels for selected borrowers,
effectively reducing the risks involved in targeted industrial or exporting ventures. By
42 This is, in fact, a kind of de facto nationalization. In 1961 a temporary law was introduced to limit
private shareholders' voting rights so the government could exercise control without owning majority
shares.
43 See Woo (1991).
both design and default, the primary beneficiaries of these consessional rates have been the
conglomerates, chaebol. At times charging as little as half the ordinary bank rate, the
government was able to assure chaebol participation in government-promoted ventures in
exchange for continued receipt of these policy loans. During the 1960s and 1970s, this
difference between the general lending rates and preferential export rates averaged eight to
fifteen points in Korea, compared with a spread of only five to seven points for Taiwan
during the same period.44 Since 1983, when the government began to phase out policy
loans, bank rates have remained roughly half of curb market rates, indicating a continued
scarcity of funds and a brokering position for the state.
The financial policy together with the protection of domestic markets is the most
powerful policy measure that the government used in encouraging private firms to invest
into more capital-intensive, large-scale, and high-risk strategic industries like shipbuilding,
automobile, and petrochemicals. Since the scale economies were large and the worldwide
markets were dominated by a few huge foreign firms from advanced economies, local
firms were reluctant to invest without the government's back-up. At the same time, by
these policy tools, the government could rationalize the infant industries, limiting the
number of new entry of local firms. In these industries, as Germany shows, cartels could
be an efficient mechanism to overcome the negative feedback among excessive
production, severe price competition, and overall costs to economy. It is well known that
even the Japanese MITI, regardless of its willingness, failed to rationalized specific
industry like petrochemicals (1950s), automobiles (1960s), and computer industry (1970s)
due to the opposition of private banks, the major stock holders of relevant companies.
44 See Cho (1989).
Korea's experience shows that for a late industrializing country, financial policy and
market protections can be used as efficient tools to induce investments and to rationalize
the industry.
Support under Monitoring and Protection under Competition
As for the export-push as well as the HCI promotion, the government not only supported
the private firms with export incentives but also checked the performance and penalized
poor performers. Unlike the Latin American countries where the incentives were given-
away, this monitoring system continuously placed domestic firms to survive the fierce
international competitions.
Even in the early import substitution stage in HCI, while the Korean government's
industrial policies provided the strong protection of targeted infant industries from the
potential competition with foreign products in domestic market, the protection was
provided under the condition of necessary competition. Most importantly, by permitting
more than two firms in a targeted industry, the government formulated oligopolistic
market structure encouraging competitions among local firms. And shortly later by
encouraging firms invested in HCI to export, the government let them compete with
foreign firms internationally. Consequently, Korea could overcome the classic problems
of managerial inefficiency usually happened in protected business sectors. The managerial
inefficiency was a major problem of Latin American countries where subsidies were given-
away without adequate checking and monitoring and where import-substitution strategy
survived comparably for a long period.
The Promotion of Conglomerates
The industrialization of the USA and Germany was accomplished by the technical
innovation in the context of mass production and conglomerates with multidivisions. 45
Similarly, Korea's industrialization were also dominated by conglomerates, Chaebols,
around the development of heavy and chemical industries.
The chaebol dominate the Korean economy and have gained increasing international
recognition as well. In 1974, the top ten chaebol had sales equivalent to 15 per cent of
GNP. In 1986, the top ten chaebol had total sales of over $65 billion, more than 65 per
cent of Korea's 1986 GNP. That same year, among the fifty largest firms in Korea, thirty
were owned by the ten largest chaebol. In 1991, the top five chaebol had revenues of
$116 billion, equivalent to just under half of Korea's 1991 GNP. Internationally,
Fortune's 1992 "Global 500" listing of the world largest industrial corporations includes
nine Korean chaebol. The huge size of these groups relative to the Korean economy has
led to a high degree of concentration at all levels. In addition to chaebol's dominating the
whole economy, their affiliates control most of the specific industries in which they
participate.
Since the early 1980s, in a perception that further concentration of the Korean
economy on chaebols would cause a critical structural problem, the government has tried
to adjust the chaebol-dominated economic structure. The government has strengthened
antitrust regulations. In addition, the government bounded the net amount of bank loans
to chaebols at a given time and tried to reduce the bound-level. Accordingly, the
45 See Amsden (1989).
relationship between the government and chaebol has changed continuously.46 Today's
situation is subtle. As the government tried to remedy the structural problems of too
much concentration of the Korean economy on chaebols by strengthening antitrust
regulations, there have happened a lot of conflicts between the two. However, at the same
time, as Korea has tried to move into more technology-intensive industries, chaebols are
supposed to play a more important role. In this respect, there still are intimate
cooperation between the two, and the government still supports chaebols with such policy
measures as R&D funds.
Throughout the early stage of Korea's industrialization, the industrial policy, especially
the HCI promotion, contributed to the rise of big companies by providing comprehensive,
preferential incentive packages to small number of selected firms. The size of chaebol and
their broad diversification have allowed them to survive the hardships of late
industrialization, to penetrate the numerous foreign markets, and to supplant the need for
multinational firms to undertake major investments in targeted businesses such as
shipbuilding, automobiles, and semiconductors where international markets had oligopoly
structure and entry barriers were high. In this regard, the promotion of chaebol was an
adequate and inevitable choice for Korea at that time.
Productive Interministry Relationships
During the early stage of rapid economic growth, Korean government maintained
productive Intermninistry relationships less exposed to sectionalism under the consistent
46 Cho divides government-chaebol relations into four periods, reflecting major shifts in the political
institutional environment surrounding the chaebol: 1945-1960 (laissez-faire); 1961-1972 (mercantilism);
1973-1979 (paternalism); 1980-1991 (constitutionalism). (See Cho (1992) pp. 48-55.)
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leadership of the President. This relationship enabled economic planning authorities, the
Economic Planning Board in macroeconomic policies and the Ministry of Trade and
Industry in microeconomic, industrial policies, to employ a full range of policy
instruments. Industrial policy can be coordinated with important policy instruments,
especially with credit policy of the Ministry of Finance. Even though the Taiwan
government also had powerful authority over credit allocation, the government agency in
charge of planning industrial policies has little clout over the conservative financial agency
that controlled actual policy tools; therefore, there has been little linkage between the plan
and instruments, and this in turn resulted in the distrust of private firms about the
government's sectoral industrial policy. Due to this, Taiwan government failed to
rationalized capital intensive industries like automobiles and semiconductor memories to
achieve economies of scale for international competition. Without government's promised
long-term payoffs, it seems almost impossible to develop such industries with high risks in
market entry in developing countries. In this case, companies refrained from long-term,
large scale ventures, and concentrated their efforts on dividing up the existing market and
exploring the emerging niches with relatively low entry barriers. This provides one of the
reasons of why Korea is competitive in large-scale, capital-intensive businesses - like
shipbuilding, automobiles and memory semiconductors - while Taiwan is proud of medium
and small scale, niche businesses - like PCs and customized semiconductor designs-.47
47 See Chu (1994).
Desirable Relationship between the Government and Private Sectors
In the early stage, the relationship between the government and private firms could be
represented as close and productive. It may not be right to argue that the government
unilaterally disciplined private firms. The relationship was bilateral in that while the
government supported and sometimes penalized firms by such policy measures as credit
allocations and market protection (stick and carrots), the planning of industry policy
largely depended on private firms' information and advice. During the early stage of
Korea's industrialization (1960s-1970s) as mentioned before "the growth-first strategy"
was a Korea's nationwide motto. This spirit prevailed not only in the government but also
in private sector. President Park regularly held a monthly meeting to facilitate the
coordination and to induce nationwide consensus and strategies for industrial
development. In the monthly meeting not only government officials and bank managers
but also top managers and even the production line workers participated. Under the
circumstance the classic problems of "information asymmetry" between the government
and private sectors as well as the "moral hazard" of the private firms, which constituted
major reasons for government failure, could be minimized. In addition, since the Korean
economy was small, and since the development of economic institutions was poor, the
centralized planning under the intimate relationships with business firms could be an
desirable choice for Korea to facilitate the Korea's industrial development.
3.4.2 Evaluation of Industry-Specific Policy
Almost all literature emphasized the effectiveness of Korea's outward-looking growth
strategy for its economic take-off. However, despite a large body of research, there is
little consensus on the role that industrial policies have played in this performance. Some
have seen in Korea's experience the vindication of market-oriented ideas while others have
emphasized the role of government interventions in the trade and industrial arenas.
The World Bank, through The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public
Policy (1993), finds in the East Asian experience a confirmation of "market-friendly
approach to policy. It provides to debunk industrial policy's impact on East Asia's
economies:
We find very little evidence that industrial policies have affected either the sectoral
structure of industry or rates of productivity change. Industrial policies were largely
ineffective.
A recent comparative research of Korea and Taiwan about the productivity growth and
structural change in the manufacturing industries also made a similar conclusion48 :
Policies in Taiwan and Korea have been quite similar in the areas of monetary policy,
interest rates, education, and exchange rates. Concerning incentives targeted to specific
industries, on the other hand, policies in the two economies have been quite different;
however, the aggregate performance of the two economies have been remarkably similar.
This outcome is consistent with the hypothesis that industry-specific interventions
(industrial targeting) have not been an important cause of growth in either economy.
Many economists have expressed skepticism about the ability of governments to
undertake successful targeting although they admits the desirability of industrial targeting.
The influence from interest groups, information asymmetry between the government and
its clients, and the tendency of individual government to maximize their bargaining power
may result in distorted targeting rather than an optimal solution.
Yet there are many counter arguments about the World Bank's point of view of
industrial targeting. Particularly, the underlying assumptions of neoclassical theory in
48 See Dollar (1994).
evaluating the productivity growth - constant returns to scale, perfect competition, long-
run equilibrium with variability of all factor inputs, including capital stocks - are typically
unsuitable for the estimation of rapidly growing dynamic economies like Korea in the
1970s and early 1980s. 49 The new growth theory stress the importance of nonconstant
scale economies in explaining the sustained high growth of newly industrialized
economies.
Amsden, Wade, and others cite the experiences of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China as
prime examples of how governments can counter market failures by fostering growth by
governing markets and getting price wrong to facilitate the establishment and growth of
industrial sectors that would not nave thrived under the workings of comparative
advantages.50 Amsden points out that in the case of late industrialization which is driven
by borrowing technology or learning, low wages even in the labor-intensive sectors like
textiles, usually fail to provide a cost advantage at market determined prices. Amsden
stress that persistent problems of competitiveness even after sharp exchange rate
devaluation have compelled the state to play a more active role than in the past."5 Amsden
also argues that the World Bank report on "East Asian Miracle" is largely a failed attempt
to defend the neoclassical position in explaining the success of East Asian economies and
that industrial policies have been effective and non-neoclassical tools for economic
development with government complementing market factors by creating an environment
conductive for economic growth.
49 See Kwon (1994) pp. 635-644.
50 See Amesden (1989), Wade (1990).
51 See Amesden (1989).
In deed, the industry-specific policies until the late 1970s resulted in several problems
such as the concentration of the Korean economy on chaebols, the distortion of financial
resource allocation as well as the poor viability of financial institutions, and more
explicitly, the over investment in HCI and subsequent suffering. However, on the other
hand, the original target of the HCI promotion drive (making HCI products to account for
50 per cent of total manufactured commodity products by 1980) was almost achieved by
1980. As a matter of fact, the major products leading the development of the Korean
economy today are products of HCI such as electronic products, steel products,
automobiles, chemical products, ships, and machinery. In addition, chaebols have
developed managerial, technological, and financial capabilities to survive the international
competitions. They are, and will be leaders of Korea's industrial development. In this




as a New Paradigm
During the 1980s, the major philosophy of the Korean government in prompting industrial
development was shifted to functional industry policies complementing market-failures,
from the past, industry-specific policies. As discussed in Chapter 1, since, on the one
hand, technological development accompanies, by its nature, reasons for market failures,
and, on the other hand, the Korean industry still needs government's back-up to move into
high-value-added and technology-intensive sectors, technology policy became a new
paradigm of the government as an adequate industry policy. The past 15 years is a period
when the government aggressively strengthened technology policy and, at the same time,
struggled to establish an optimal mechanisms to execute technology policy according to
changing environments. This chapter addresses the evolution of Korean government's
technology policy and its adequacy.
4.1 Evolution of Technology Policy
4.1.1 Establishment of Elementary Technical Infrastructure: 1950s-1970s
The Division of Vocational Education established in the Ministry of Education in July of
1948 was the first administrative institution dealing with technology policy. In 1966 by
establishing the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Korea held a central
coordinating body for the national science and technology policy in the ministry level. In
that time, the primary missions of the MOST were to establish a elementary technological
infrastructure by strengthening scientific and technical education and by establishing
legislative regulations for supporting research and development. Under these missions,
the MOST established the Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS) as a specialized
graduate school of engineering for long-term human resource development. This school
has been one of the national leaders in engineering research and education. In addition,
the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) was inaugurated as an integrated
and multidisciplinary research and development institute in 1966. The MOST started to
legislate science and technology related acts and regulations, and the Science and
Technology Fund was created by the Science and Technology Promotion Act in 1968.
During the 1970s, the government established strategic industrial technology research
institutes in order to facilitate the transfer of foreign technology and to strengthen
indigenous technological capability (including the Korea Ship Research Institute, the
Korea Electronic Technology Institute, the Korea Machinery and Metal Research
Institute, the Korea Institute of Chemistry, and the Ocean Development Research
Institute) based on the Specific Research Institute Supporting Act enacted in 1973.
Interestingly, large portion of these institutes were under the supervision of action-
oriented ministries, which were in charge of the promotion of specific industries, like the
Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Communication, rather than solely
under the control of the MOST. The Korean government regarded the linkage between
the industry and technology more importantly during this period. And as discussed later,
the role of the MOST as a coordinator in technology-related policies was substantially
weak during this period.
In 1974 the government started to construct Daeduk Science Park to encourage
mutual coordination among public and private research institutes. The first tax incentive
system for technology development, the Technology Development Reserve System, which
required firms to put a portion of their profits into reserves earmarked for technology
development, was introduced in 1976. In addition, as the first financing institution
exclusive for industrial technology development, the Korea Technology Promotion
Corporation was established to support venture businesses in 1976. In the same year,
Korea Development Bank started a loan program for technology development.
4.1.2 Technology-Driven Industrial Development: 1980s-1990s
The 1980s were the period when the government really started to view science and
technology as the most important factor to sustain industrial growth. As Korea began to
move into high value-added and technology-intensive industries, and as Korean firms had
caught up with frontier firms from advanced economies, it became more difficult to
acquire technology from abroad. The Japanese firms, in particular, were said to be
rethinking their strategy of helping Korean firms acquire technical expertise. As Korean
products began competing directly with Japanese makers on the local and international
market, that boomerang phenomenon was very bothersome. And Japanese firms became
reluctant to help Korean partners since all too rapidly, they became rivals.5 2 In addition,
products in these high-technology industries were highly differentiated by their features,
quality, brand name, and level of technical sophistication. New technologies were
52 Asian Business, May 1984, p. 64.
constantly being developed, often at high costs and risks. The US and Japanese firms
competed fiercely for global markets and closely guarded their technological advantages.
Therefore, for the Korean government, the emphasis on technical policy was an inevitable,
imminent choice.
Accordingly, throughout the 1980s, a large body of policy measures were newly
introduced. Many tax benefits for supporting technology development such as tax
reduction system for technical manpower development, tax exemption for real estates used
by private research institutes, income tax exemption for foreign scientists and engineers,
and preferential taxes for investment from venture corporation were established.
Furthermore, a reduction of tariff and Special Consumption Tax for research instruments,
facilities, and product samples were implemented.
In addition, the government enacted the New Technology Commercialization
Financing Promotion Act in 1986, by which it promotes and invests in the formation of
financial institutions specifically catering to the needs of new technology-based firms.
The import of technology has been liberalized in all sectors of industry to stimulate the
import of foreign technologies. In the 1970s, royalties paid to foreign firms could not
exceed 10% of sales, and the term of the contract had to be under 10 years. Every
contract had to be explicitly approved by the relevant government ministry, usually those
of trade and industry, or science and technology. In the early 1980s, these regulations
were gradually loosened so that, by 1987, all licenses were automatically approved unless
the relevant ministry asked for changes within 20 days of notification: the screening
system on the import of technology by the government was changed to a reporting system.
In reviewing licensing contracts, the government followed guidelines issued by Fair Trade
Agency, which did not like so-called restrictive clauses that: (i) obligated the licensee to
purchase inputs from the licensers; (ii) restricted exports by the licensee; (iii) controlled
the licensee's quality and price levels; (iv) prohibited the licensee from handling competing
products; (v) unilaterally obligated the licensee to provide information on any technical
improvements it developed. However, despite the government's serious concern about
these issues, many technology licensing contracts contained such provisions. It is argued
that the government sometimes strengthened the hand of the Korean firms in negotiations
with foreign licensers. If a contract proposal was rejected because of restrictive clauses,
the Korean firm could go back to the licenser with the government's backing. But in
many cases, the restrictive clauses would still be included in side-letters to the formal
contract."3
For inward foreign direct investment, the system of positive list - listing industries open
to foreign direct investment - was switched to that of negative list - listing those that were
prohibited -, raising the number of 4 digit ISIC industries from 521 to 660. Terms and
conditions have also been relaxed very much. As Korea become an important world
competitor, it found it increasingly difficult to obtain foreign technologies it needs unless it
allowed foreign suppliers greater ownership control or favorable terms.
During the 1980s, one of the most important change was that the action-oriented
ministries, such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), the Ministry of Energy
(merged with the MTI in 1993), and the Ministry of Communication (MOC), began to
emphasize technology policy. In 1986, by enacting the Industry Development Act, the
MTI started supporting R&D subsidies for technology development. Based on the same
53 Quoted from Harvard Business School Case Materials, Korea's Technology Strategy, 1988
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law, the MTI established Industrial Development Fund, which is a long-term, low interest-
rates loans for technological development of private firms. In 1988, the MTI formed the
Small and Medium Industry Promotion Fund as a loan for supporting the technology
development of small and medium size firms. In 1992 the Data Communication
Promotion Fund was established by the MOC to facilitate R&D efforts in the
telecommunications and related industries. With the R&D subsidies and loans, the
government started national research and development projects with the participation of
private firms, public research institutes, and universities. On the one hand, the increasing
efforts of individual ministries in technology policies resulted in the rapid expansion of the
government's budget base for technical development. However, on the other hand, this
resulted in undesirable conflicts among ministries around technology policies and
increased duplicative efforts, causing serious inefficiency.
Since the mid-1980s, individual ministries began to plan long-term technology policies
under the culture of national economic development plan. But the effects of this plan has
been largely negligible as presented below. In 1985, the MOST published a Long-range
Science and Technology Plan that was based on the results of conferences held over two
years among 500 specialists from private and public sectors. The plan called for Korea to
place among the world's top 10 most technologically advanced countries by the year
2000. It targeted five fields as follows: (i) Income Earning: microelectronics, Information
and automatic systems, and fine chemistry; (ii) Potentially Successful: new materials and
genetic engineering; (iii) Industrial Support: systems engineering, project management,
quality control, research methods; (iv) Public Welfare: health and environment; (v) Future
Potential; oceanography and aerospace. The plan forecasted that by the year 2000 Korea
would have caught up with developed countries in the first field and substantially closed
the gap in the second and third fields. The plan's policy guidelines covered three areas:
manpower development, R&D spending, and international cooperation.54 By strengthening
educational programs and encouraging study abroad, the number of scientists and
engineers in the country would grow from 37,000 to 150,000 between 1986 and 2000.
Through direct spending by the state and incentive packages to private firms, the country's
R&D spending would increase from 2% to 5% of GNP. Finally, international investment
and licensing in Korea would be encouraged as a means of acquiring technology from
abroad. The plan itself was not quite successful due to the lack in specific implementation
programs and the failure in inducing cooperation from other ministries. However, the
basic philosophy was inherited to later projects.
Similarly, the MTI made a plan for promoting high-technology industries in 1988. It
was also developed under a variety of advice and consultancy from academia and industry.
It chose five industries as a target to strategically promote: microelectronics;
mechatronics; biotechnology- new materials; and environment. But the MTI also failed to
enact a relevant law, the High-Technology Industry Development Act, due to the chronic
problem of territorial struggle and sectionalism among technology-related ministries.
During the 1980s the MTI, MOC, and MOST respectively tried to enact a law to
facilitate the computerization of Korea and to promote the information industry. However,
the relevant act was just enacted as later as in 1995. During the 1980s, unlike the past, the
government exposed a serious problem in coordinating interministrial cooperation.
54 The plan offers only general guidelines. Because of limited R&D and investment resources, Korea has
to be selective within the broad fields. The plan let the future five-year economic development plans to set
stricter priorities according to criteria such as economic rates of return, probability of success, industrial
and technological linkages, and national security and public welfare needs. (See HBS 1988)
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4.2 Evaluation of the Technology Policy
Until the late 1970s when export-push and HCI promotion policy relying on borrowing
technology dominated the industrial development, the voice to emphasize technology
policy had been relatively weak. However, during the 1980s and 1990s technology policy
became a new paradigm for prompting industrial development of Korea. The emphasis on
technology policy during the past 15 years has contributed to the quantitative increase in
Korea's technical capabilities. However, it included lots of potential problems as well.
4.2.1 Positive effects of the Past Industry Policy
As shown in section 4.3, the Korean government pushed industrial policy to protect the
infant industry and to promote exports. Both created strong demand for foreign
technologies. Since there was no local capability to establish and operate production
systems, local firms had to rely completely on foreign sources for production processes,
product specifications, production know-how, technical personnel and component parts.
Studies in the electronics, machinery, steel, computer industries demonstrate that import
substitution under protection was a most powerful instrument that has facilitated
technology transfer from abroad, leading to the emergence of new industries, and the
introduction of more sophisticated products in the existing industries."55 As for export
promotion, since the government not only supported the firms with export incentive
packages but also checked the performance, this continuously placed pressure on firms to
acquire foreign technology and to use it effectively in order to be able to compete in
foreign markets. However, despite demand for foreign technology, the government policy
on the supply side of formal technology transfers such as inward direct foreign investment
55 See Kim (1992) pp. 437-452.
and foreign technology licensing was quite restrictive during this period. In the early
stage of industrialization, technology is not a critical factor and the necessary mature
technologies could be acquired through other mechanisms. Instead, the government
promoted technology transfer through the procurement of turnkey plants and capital
goods. This policy led to massive imports of foreign capital goods at the cost of retarding
the development of local capital good industry. Protection of machinery industry was
relatively low until the early 1970s, giving capital good users almost free access to foreign
capital goods. In addition, the tariff exemptions on imported capital goods and the
financing of purchases by supplier's credit which carried low interest rates relative to those
on the domestic market all worked to increase the attractiveness of capital good imports.
As a result, inward direct foreign investment had a minimal impact on Korean economy.
4.2.2 Quantitative Enhancement in R&D Capabilities
Although the Korean economy has recorded one of the highest GNP growth rates, R&D
expenditures rose faster than GNP, increasing its share of GNP from 0.38 in 1970 to 0.77
in 1980, and to 2.33 in 1993 (Table 4-1).
TABLE 4-1 Annual R&D Spending
(unit: billion won, %)
1965 1970 1980 1985 1990 1993
Total R&D Spending 2 11 283 1,237 3,350 6,153
-by govemment 1.7 7.7 153 309 637 1,056
- by private firms 0.3 3.3 130 928 2,713 5,107
Government : Private 87:73 70:30 54:45 25:75 19:81 17:83
R&D as percent of GNP 0.26 0.38 0.77 - 1.95 2.33
Annual Growth Ratio - 40.0 39.0 34.3 22.0 22.5
- of government 35.3 34.8 15.1 15.6 18.4
- of private firms 61.5 44.1 48.2 23.9 23.5
Source. the MOST, 1994 Annual Report for Science and Technology
The government funds increased significantly from 7.7 billion won to 153 billion won
and to 1,506 billion won during the same period. But more impressive fact is that there
was a massive increase in private R&D efforts. In the face of increasing market
competition in both domestic and international markets and with various government
incentives, private R&D investment rapidly increased form a mere 3.3 billion won in 1970
to 130 billion in 1980 and to 5,107 billion won in 1993, raising its share of total R&D
expenditures from 30 per cent to 45 per cent and to 83 per cent during the same time. Yet
the corporate R&D still heavily relied on government's preferential financing for R&D
activities. For instance, in 1987 about 64 per cent of the total R&D expenditures in
manufacturing corporate R&D was accounted for by the preferential financing.5 6
Preferential financing has come from several sources: technology development fund
earmarked within the National Investment Fund; Industrial Development Fund; the Korea
Development Bank's Technology Development Fund; Industrial Technological Promotion
Fund earmarked for Automation and New Material Development; and the Small and
Medium Industry Promotion Fund. In addition, a lot of tax incentives have contributed
the rapid increase in R&D investments of the private firms.
In this regard, the government's technology policies can be said to contribute to the
overall strengthening of Korea's R&D capacity. The rapid increase in Korea's R&D
expenditures until the early 1990s has a significant meaning. In 1995, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) introduced an international agreement that would restrict the
government's support of R&D funds: today, governments can support only 75 per cent of
total R&D expenditures of industrial research projects, and 50 per cent of pre-competitive
56 See Kim (1991).
research projects. This new regulation directly restricts the government's funding in
commercial technology developments, which have been the main goals of the Korean
government's technology policies. Therefore, there can be an argument that the Korean
government should have increased the R&D funds more rapidly and have supported the
private firms' commercial R&D projects more widely in the past. But this may be
unfeasible given the limited size of the Korean economy and its budget. More important
matter is the adequacy of the goals and mechanisms of the government's R&D projects.
This will be discussed later.57
4.2.3 Failure in Developing the Higher Educational System
As shown in Chapter 2, the establishment of higher educational institutes for training
engineers and scientists provided a foundation to Germany and the United States in
surpassing the industrial power of Britain in the early twentieth century. However, the
past 15 year efforts of the Korean government failed to establish the higher educational
institutions and to develop in time an adequate stock of highly trained scientists and
engineers who should be able to play a key role today and in the near future. The student-
professor ratio has retrogressed from 22.6 in 1966 to 35.8 in 1985, and to ?? in 1993
making all universities primarily undergraduate teaching-oriented rather than graduate
research-oriented. In 1993 Korea had 244 universities (including vocational schools)
which had science or engineering schools, and these schools spent 445 billion won for
R&D, about 2 billion won (about $2.3 million) per university. This is undoubtedly lower
than that of the advanced countries. The R&D expenditures of universities in Korea
57 See p. 85.
accounted for 7.2 per cent in 1993. Not only the net amount but also the share is lower
than that of advanced countries (Table 4-2). As a result, Korea is now facing the problem
of weak linkages between university education and educational demands from industry.
Universities also expose serious weakness in basic research capabilities.
TABLE 4-2 The Share of R&D Expenditures for Each Research Institute
(unit: %)
Korea Britain Germany France USA Japan
Universities 7.2 17.0 16.6 15.9 16.1 12.2
Public Institutes 4.4 16.1 15.2 22.2 10.3 8.7
Non-profit institutes 16.9 4.1 0.4 0.8 3.7 4.3
Private Firms 71.5 62.8 67.8 61.1 69.9 74.8
Source. the MOST, 1994 Annual Report for Science and Technology, 1995
1993 data for Korea and the USA, 1992 data for the other countries
In addition, in the distribution of R&D personnel Korea faces a structural problem. As
shown in table 4-3 and 4-4, about three fourth of Ph.D. in science and engineering belong
to universities and only about 9 per cent in private firms while the latter spend 10 times
more R&D funds than the former.
TABLE 4-3 The Share of R&D Personnel (1992)
(unit: %)
No. of total R&D University Private Firms Research
personnel institutes
Total 88,764 26.2 57.5 16.3
Ph.D. 22,484 73.7 8.4 17.9
Masters 25,717 23.3 50.6 26.1
Bachelors 36,962 1.7 88.8 9.5
etc.* 3,601 1.6 93.1 5.3
Source. the MOST, 1994 Annual Report for Science and Technology, 1995
etc*: graduates from vocational schools
TABLE 4-3 The Share of R&D Expenditures (1992)
(unit: %)
Total R&D Expenditures University Private Firms Research institutes
6,153 billion won 7.2 67.3 25.5
Source. the MOST, 1994 Annual Report for Science and Technology, 1995
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Furthermore, Korean universities have depended more on private firms than on the
government in sourcing R&D funds (Table 4-4). In 1993 R&D funding from the private
firms accounted for 75 per cent of total R&D expenditures in the universities while the
government funding accounted for only 25 per cent.58 By contrast, in the advanced
countries like the United States and Germany, the universities sourced about 90 per cent
of their R&D expenditures from the government. This does not represent that in Korea
the linkage between the university and industry is closer than in other advanced countries.
Rather than this, the structure points out that the university research in Korea is in
embryonic stage and the government have preferred firm-initiated research projects to
university researches.
TABLE 4-4 The Funding Source of University R&D (1993)
Total Government Industry Ratio (A:B)
Expenditure (A) (B)
Korea (billion won) 303 76 226 25:75
USA (billion $) 19.0 10.9 1.4 89:11
Germany (billion mark) 11.6 10.7 0.9 92:8
Source. Korean Industrial Technology Association, Major Indicators of Industrial
Technology, 1994. (1991 data for Germany)
The number of students with bachelor degree is comparable with that of advanced
countries. Indeed the number exceeds that of Germany and Britain, and Japan in physical
science field. But the number of students with higher degrees is smaller than that of
58 Among the R&D funds from private firms, some portion comes from the government's funding for
private firms' R&D projects. This means that universities have often participated as subcontractors of
government-supported, private firms' R&D projects. In this respect, the government supported more than
25 per cent of universities R&D expenditures practically.
advanced countries, and there is still a significant gap in the number of Ph.D. students in
particular. (Table 4-5).
TABLE 4-5 Degree Granted by Field of Science
Type of Degree Physical Science Engineering
Korea ('93) Bachelor 26,835 34,604
Master 2,381 3,493
Doctor 489 700
USA ('89) Bachelor 57,898 120,025
Master 13,985 38,282
Doctor 8,927 5,691
Japan ('91) Bachelor 14,176 87,404
Master ('90) 2,984 13,117
Doctor ('90) 835 1,967
Germany ('89) Bachelor 14,338 12,086
Doctor 4,886 1,400
Britain ('89) Bachelor 23,800 16,900
Master/Doctor 7,600 4,900
Source. Korean Industrial Technology Association, Major Indicators of Industrial
Technology, 1994. (1991 data for Germany)
In this regard, Korea has failed to develop the research-oriented science and
engineering manpower needed in the 1990s to sustain its industrial development.
4.2.4 Failure in Developing the Small&Medium Size Firms' R&D capability
Korea's industrial R&D investments have been dominated by large size firms due to the
prominent role of the chaebols in the industrial development. In 1992 the Korean industry
invested 3,154 billion won in research and development. Of this the small and medium
size firms accounted for 13 per cent and big firms shared the rest 87 per cent (Table 4-6).
TABLE 4-6 R&D Expenditures by Firm Size (1992)
(unit: billion won)
Large Firms Small & Medium Ratio
(A) Firms (B) (A:B)
Industry Total 3,154 472 87:13
- Manufacturing Ind. 2,633 396 87:13
Source. Korea Industrial Technology Association, Major Indicators of Industrial Technology,
1994. (The criteria for distinguishing a large size firm is the number of employees that exceeds
1,000)
The comparison of the R&D concentration level with other countries shows the relative
weakness of medium and small size firms' R&D activities in Korea. As Table 4-7 shows,
the top 20 companies accounted for about 50 per cent of total industrial R&D investments
in Korea in 1992 while the share is 30 per cent in the United States (1987 data) and 36 per
cent in Japan. The top five firms shared as much as 30 per cent of industrial R&D
investments in Korea comparing with 17 per cent in the other two countries.
TABLE 4-7 Concentration of R&D Expenditures
(unit: %)
Korea USA Japan
Top 5 companies 30.1 17.0 17.1
Top 10 companies 39.1 22.8 26.6
Top 20 companies 49.8 30.6 36.3
Source. Korea Industrial Technology Association, Major Indicators of Industrial Technology,
1994.
The number of research laboratory is 2,502 in 1993 in Korea. Of these the number of
firm laboratory is 1,690 (67.5%); public institutes 83 (3.3%), and university laboratories
729 (29.2%). Among firm laboratories one third is those of big companies. In addition,
about two third of the laboratory of small and medium size firms is established in the
1990s while there is no research laboratory of small and medium size firms before 1982
(Table 4-8). All these observations suggest that the technology policy has little
contributed to the enhancement of small and medium size firms' technical capabilities.
TABLE 4-8 Establishment of Industrial Research Institutes by Firm Size
Large firms Small & Medium Size Accumulated number
Firms
-1981 47 0 235
1985 32 10 624
1990 34 108 966
1991 74 161 1,201
1992 37 197 1,435
1993 45 210 1,690
Source. Korea Industrial Technology Association, Major Indicators of Industrial Technology,
1994.
4.2.5 Problems in Administrative Procedures
As shown in Chapter 2, recent years have been marked by widespread, worldwide major
institutional changes, when compared with the situation of the 1980s. The main
developments are of two kinds in the matter of administrative structure: changes in policy
coordinating structures at the highest level of government; and reorganization of
administrative structures that support science and technology.
In this respect, Korea's current administrative structure is exposing several problems.
First, the coordination of technology policies has been inefficient in Korea. The Ministry
of Science and Technology (MOST), a normative central coordinator, has failed to
coordinate the technology policies of other ministries effectively. During the early stage
of industrialization until the early 1980s, comparing with other ministries, especially the
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) that have shaped industrial policies, the voice of the
MOST had been relatively weak. Each ministry had carried out technology-related
policies under the coordination of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) rather than the
MOST. During this period, it may be safe to assume that the MOST's technology policies
were not integrated into national development plan.59 Since the mid-1980s, as other
ministries, especially the MTI and the Ministry of Communication (MOC) regarded
technology policies as a major underlying factor in the promotion of trade and industry,
there have been territorial conflicts among ministries to grip the hegemony in technology
59 See Kim (1992).
policies. However, as long as the MOST executes its own technology policies, it seems
difficult to expect other ministries' cooperation.
In Korea there have been several trials to establish a coordinating agency at the highest
government level. However, they have not been satisfactory. The National Council for
Science and Technology was established in 1973 to bring about interministrial
coordination, but met briefly only once upon inception and never functioned thereafter. In
1982 the Korean government introduced a quarterly Presidential Conference for
Promotion of Science and Technology, similar to a pattern adopted in the 1970s to
achieve export promotion. However, this was scaled down in 1990 to a President's
Science and Technology Advisory Council whose role is restricted to advice and
consultancy without any explicit tool to evaluate each ministry's policies and to enforce
coordination. The figure 4-1 represents the current administrative structure of Korean
government's technology policies, which requests sophisticated restructuring.
Figure 6-1 The Administrative Structure of Korean Government's Technology Policy
@Universities *Research Institutes *Industries
*Specific R & D Projects
*National R & D Programs *Technical Training
*National R & D Programs
Min
Edu
Second, at the ministry level, the Korean government entails a fundamental reason to
give rise to territorial conflicts. Normatively, the MOST is in charge of promoting basic
research capabilities. However, recently, as the Ministry of Education (MOE) began to
strengthen the technology policies to support the research activities of higher educational
institutions, key actors in basic research, there have happened territorial conflicts between
the two ministries around basic research related policies. Furthermore, nowadays it
becomes more and more difficult to distinguish basic research from applied or industrial
research, especially in high-technology sectors. Even though the distinction is possible,
the transition time for the results from basic research to be exploited for commercial
purpose becomes shorter. In this respect, the definition of the MOST's role inevitably
results in policy conflicts with other ministries that are in charge of prompting the
development of high-technology industries, especially the MTI and MOC.
4.2.6 Weakness in Basic Research Capability
For a late industrialization country like Korea, it is an important but difficult task to decide
which technologies of industries are to be supported as strategic sectors that fit best to its
particular stage of industrialization process. Accordingly, the country inevitably faces the
strategic choice about how much it needs to focus on basic research and how much on
industrial technology. Basic science has stronger externalities with weak marketability
while industrial technology is more market-oriented.
In this regard, a OECD report points out that a large number of countries show a shift
in policy emphasis towards support for technology rather than for basic science, with
government allocating funding to innovation in order to maintain economic
competitiveness and stimulate growth. This is particularly evident in the countries with
Anglo-Saxon traditions, where governments are attempting to capitalize on their existing
science bases. The most significant undertaking in this respect is the Technology Initiative
launched by the Clinton Administration in the United States, which signals a major shift in
US policy towards industrial technology. However, Japan represent a quite contrary trend
in that it strengthens the basic research more and more.
In Korea the government technology policy has tended to concentrate on commercial
projects and almost ignored the enhancement of basic research capabilities. This
constituted one of the reasons of poor development of university system and academic
research. Despite the increase in overall R&D expenditure, amounts spent on basic
science remain small and spread thin. Basic research in Korea is supported by the Korean
Science and Engineering Foundation (KOSEF), which is modeled after the US National
Science Foundation (NSF). Its R&D budget has risen from just over $1 million in the
mid-1980s to 140 million in 1992.
4.2.7 Problems in National R&D Projects
Today the targets of Korean government's R&D subsidies can be categorized into two
groups. One is for a kind of mega-projects, and the other is for small and medium-size
firms' R&D projects. About 40 per cent of the subsidies is provided to mega-projects.
In 1993 the MOST under the cooperation with other ministries, initiated a specific
program, the Highly Advanced National (HAN) project, which is intended to mobilize
scientific and technical resources to help reach the country's goal of equaling the major
industrialized countries by 2000. Overall funding of 3,476 billion won will be provided by
private firms (43 per cent), public enterprises (18 per cent), and the government (39 per
cent). Emphasis will be placed on developing selected industrial technologies: high-
definition television (HDTV), electric motor vehicle, pharmaceuticals and integrated
services digital networks (ISDN). It will also support essential basic technologies: basic
technologies for 256M DRAM and iGigabit DRAM, new forms of energy, new
generations of nuclear reactors, biotechnology, the environment, new materials for
electronics and information technology, and flexible manufacturing systems technology.
The HAN project have several significant aspects: (i) they were selected by a committee
of civilian experts; (ii) they were selected by a top-down approach; (iii) they were selected
through consensus building, using a collection of ideas from researchers and discussions
with the pertinent government officials; (iv) they were examined and planned to full-
fledged projects within a very intensive four months of work; (v) they emphasized the
importance of international technological cooperation by planning to allocate between 5 to
20 per cent of the annual R&D budget for this purpose.
However, the HAN project can be criticized in several points. First, the criteria for
selecting projects is not clear. Historically, the Korean government has tended to
emphasize the development of commercial technologies and this tendency still alive in the
administrative process with inertia.60  Together with inefficiency in the administrative
structure dealing with technology policies, the inadequacy of the criteria suggests the
question that whether funding lots of portions of precious government budget into this
sort of projects is an optimal policy for exploiting the nationwide best results. Second,
almost all major participants in the HAN projects are conglomerates, especially four
60 Despite the goals presented by the government, which targets the development of basic, generic, or pre-
competitive technologies, it is difficult to say that, for instance, the 256M/1G DRAM and HDTV projects
are categorized into this area.
largest chaebols. As shown above, the weakness of the technical capability of small and
medium size firms, and the poor research capacity of higher educational institutes are
another, but very serious structural problems to overcome for furthering industrial
development. In addition, since the mid-1980s, the government has tried to correct the
structural problem of too excessive concentration of the Korean economy on several
chaebols. Under the circumstances, it may not be an optimal policy to concentrate large
portion of R&D subsidies on the projects executed by the chaebols. There can be an
argument that the chaebols still need the government support to compete with foreign
firms from advanced economies. However, the question is that given the above mentioned,
so many structural problems of the Korean economy, to increase the chaebols' technical
capacity is a so critical policy goal above all the other issues. The answer is rather "no".
With regard to the R&D subsidies for small and medium size firms (SMF), the situation
is the same as that of mega-projects except for the small amount of funding. The problem
of the SMF in carrying out their own R&D is caused by the shortage of highly educated
research manpower and lack of market information as much as by their poor financial
capabilities. Under the circumstances, less than 500 SMF are newly selected and each firm
is provided with about 80 million won (About $100 thousand) on average per annum.6 '
This presents the same question that whether to directly subsidize small number of SMF
with small amount of money is more efficient than to support the same funds to a more
fundamental policy goal such as the refining of the high educational institutes, which may
61 The number of manufacturing firms was 71,889 in 1994. Therefore, only 0.7 per cent of small and
medium size firms were selected as beneficiaries of the government R&D funding. The government
subsidies accounted for about 8 per cent of Small and medium size firms' R&D expenditures in 1992.
Both of these percentage numbers are too small to resolve the structural problem of Korea's small and
medium size firms in enhancing technical capabilities.
contribute more broadly and fairly to the strengthening of the SMF's technical capability.
The answer is also "no".
4.2.8 Problems in Collaborative Research
Since the seemingly successful management of cooperative R&D projects of the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the economics of collaborative
research even among rival firms have received considerable attention. Collaboration in
research may allow firms to lower costs and risks, and it may reduce the disincentives to
invest in intrafirm R&D that result from appropriability problems and spillovers among
firms. The greatest difficulty in appropriating the returns to basic research means that this
hypothesized advantage will be greatest for collaboration in basic research. R&D
collaboration can also reduce duplication in the R&D investment of participating firms,
and may allow participants to exploit economies of scale in the R&D process.
However, given the two natures of collaborative R&D among rival firms, i.e., the
necessity for collaboration to fully use the limited technical resources on the one hand, and
the reluctance to disclosure their proprietary technological knowledge on the other, firms
participating in a joint R&D project face prisoner dilemma-like situation, where it is
theoretically optimal for everybody to cooperate, but each firm finds it most comfortable
to be isolated to the extent possible.
The output of collaborative research must be absorbed by the participant firms and
transformed into commercially relevant knowledge. However, in order to exploit
externally performed research, whether this research is performed in a multi-firm
consortium, a federal laboratory, or a university, participant firms must invest in the
creation of in-house expertise or "absorptive capacity". Some duplication of the in-house
research investments of firms thus is inevitable even among participants in collaborative
research projects.
Therefore, even in participating in a collaborative research project, it is inevitable for a
firm to invest in the same in-house research project. The matter is how to balance the
two. The problem of the collaborative projects supported by the Korean government, for
instance the HAN projects, is that they were mainly carried out in the in-house research
centers of individual participating firms. 62 Even though the government-sponsored public
institutes supervised the projects and provided research facilities for executing
collaborative basic researches to encourage the diffusion of technical knowledge among
participants, the results in terms of cooperation have not been satisfactory. Since the
projects targeted the development of commercial technologies, the participants inevitably
tried to minimize the disclosure of proprietary technical knowledge. Since the participants
were not complementary with one another in their technical expertise, this also minimize
the motivation for cooperation. Under the circumstance the public institutes, which the
government delegated the responsibility for supervising the project, faced limitations in
facilitating the cooperation, and consequently their roles were superficial and
unsatisfactory. If the collaborative projects can be said as nothing but supporting
individual participants, usually chaebols, for executing same research in their in-house
research facilities, it would have been more desirable to invest the money in other policy
62 In the case of HDTV and 64M DRAM projects, almost all major research activities were executed in
individual firms' in-house research center. In the case of TDX-10 (electronic telecommunication
switching equipment) and TICOM (medium size computer) projects, the government sponsored research
activities were carried out by using the common research facilities in ETRI (Electronics and
Telecommunication Research Institute; government sponsored public research institute), which was a
supervisory agency. However, in this case, the firms have been criticized for sending relatively low
quality researchers and for executing their in-house research respectively.
goals. For instance, top 11 chaebols accounts for 83 per cent of the patents registered in
the United States. Furthermore, the top 4 chaebols, Samsung, Hyundai, Lucky-Goldstar,
and Daewoo, which have been major participants in the Korean government's
collaborative research projects, shares 50 per cent of the patents registered in the United
States. Given this concentration of technical capabilities on small number of chaebols and
the poor technical capabilities of other institutions (such as small and medium size firms
and universities), it seems difficult to justify the current collaborative research systems of
funding individual chaebols to execute similar research activities.
4.2.9 Summary
The government's technology policy has contributed to the enhancement of Korea's
technical capabilities. R&D investments, the number of research laboratories, and
research manpower have increased rapidly. However, under the persistent inertia and
culture of industry-specific policy of the 1970s, the technology policy during the last 15
years has more focused on the development of targeted commercial technologies (like the
HAN project with the participation of conglomerates) than on the development of
technical infrastructure. The promotion of higher educational institutes and the
enhancement of small and medium size firms' technical capabilities have been delayed.
Furthermore, even the national research projects like the HAN project have exposed
substantial problems due to inefficient administrative processes. The Korean government
needs to reconsider the goals and mechanisms of technology policies.
Chapter 5
Case Analysis of the Korea's Electronics Industry
The electronics industry has been a driving force of the Korea's economic development.
In this respect, the analysis of the electronics industry provides detailed empirical
evidences about the adequacy of the government's industry policy and technology policy
as well.
5.1 Brief Review of the Development
Korea's electronics industry can be said to begin in 1958 when Goldstar began the
assembly of the AM radio in small scale garage-operation. In the mid-1960s, Korea began
the production of black and white TV sets through the international transfer of production
technology. Since domestic firms had no capability to establish production operations,
entrepreneurs who had previous trade contacts with foreign firms imported packaged
technology from overseas which included assembly processes along with product
specifications, know-how, technical personnel and component parts.63 International
transfer of packaged technology provided an initial ground for the development of
domestic electronics firms.
63 See Kim (1980).
During the 1970s, domestic firms accumulated expertise in product design and
production operation which provided a basis for indigenous efforts for the assimilation of
imported technology. Then, increased competition in domestic and international markets
and increasing capability of local researchers led to gradual improvement of foreign
technology. Until the 1970s, inward foreign direct investment held a key role in
developing the industry. Although the role was diminished rapidly during the 1980s, the
foreign firms contributed to the expansion of exports and training of domestic work
forces.
During the 1980s, Korean electronics firms began to diversify into more technology-
intensive sectors. In 1983, Samsung succeeded in developing 64K DRAM through the
technology transfer from Micron Technology, a US entrepreneurial, start-up company of
the time. In the early 1990s, however, Samsung, Hyundai, and Goldstar succeeded in
developing 16M DRAM based on domestic technological capability. In 1986, the four
conglomerates co-developed the full-electronic switching equipment, called TDX-1, under
the support and supervision of Korean Telecom, a state-owned telecommunication service
company. TDX-1 was upgraded to TDX-10 in 1989. The same four conglomerates also
co-developed a medium-range compute, TICOM, in 1991. During this period, Korea's
electronics industry gradually entered into the technical development stage of producing at
forefront of existing technology based on indigenous technological capability.
Accordingly, domestic research and development efforts have been strengthened
significantly throughout this period.
Since the late 1980s, Korean electronics firms have been internationalized rapidly. The
firms established manufacturing facilities in the developed countries to avoid the trade
conflicts. They also shifted manufacturing facilities for producing low-end products into
South East Asian countries to maintain cost competence. They purchased foreign firms or
established research centers in the developed countries, especially in the United States, to
absorb the state-of-the-art technologies. For instance, Hyundai purchased several
entrepreneurial firms in the Silicon Valley including Maxter, a hard-disk driver
manufacturer while Samsung acquired HMS, an opto-electronic semiconductor company.
In 1995, Goldstar even purchased Zenith, one of the last US consumer electronics firms,
to acquire the high-technologies and brand reputations. Furthermore, in 1995, both
Samsung and Hyundai announced the plan to build semiconductor manufacturing plants
for producing 16M DRAM in the United States, which costs more than $1 billion
respectively.
The government strategically promoted the electronics industry since the 1960s. Early
in 1969, specific measures to promote the sector's development were incorporated in the
Eight Year Electronics Industry Development Plan (1969-1976). This plan was integrated
into the successive Five Year Economic Development Plan. In 1969 the government
enacted the Electronics Industry Promotion Law that provided explicit policy measures to
support the development of the industry. Among the policy measures in that law was the
establishment of the Electronic Industry Promotion Fund. The fund was lent at preferential
rates to firms investing in high priority areas. In particular, firms establishing R&D
subsidiaries overseas were to be given preferential access to loans. The Fund was
abolished in 1986, as the government has shifted in focus to functional incentives like
R&D subsidies from sector -specific industry policies. Since the mid-1980s the electronics
industry has been a major beneficiary of the government's R&D funds.64
5.2 Major Features of Korea's Electronics Industry
5.2.1 Leading Industry of the Korean Economy
Since the mid-1980s, the electronics industry has been the major driving force to lead the
Korea's industrial development and economic growth.6 5 In 1994 the exports of the
electronics industry accounted for 32.2% of Korea's total exports. Its value-added
accounted for 14.0%, and its employment shared 11.6 per cent, of that of manufacturing
industry respectively (Table 5-1).
TABLE 5-1 Basic Indicators of Korea's Electronics Industry
1985 1990 1992 1994
Total Exports (A) 30,283 65,016 76,632 96,013
- Electronics Exports (B) 4,780 17,658 21,145 30,953
Ratio (B/A, %) 15.8 27.1 27.6 32.2
VA in Manufacturing (A) 24,530 52,351 60,001 69,536
-Electronics VA (B) 1,365 5,932 6,885 9,768
Ratio (B/A, %) 5.6 11.3 11.5 14.0
Employment in mfg (A) 3,504 4,911 4,828 4,696
- Electronics (B) 300 477 436 544
Ratio (B/A,%) 8.6 9.7 9.0 11.6
R&D invest. in mfg (A) 751 2,374 3,626 4,398
- Electronics (B) 292 993 1,216 1,769
Ratio (B/A, %) 38.8 41.8 33.5 40.2
No. of researcher in mfg (A) 18,996 38,737 51,074 54,078
- Electronics (B) 6,161 15,923 18,777 20,064
Ratio (B/A, %) 32.4 41.1 36.8 37.1
Patents registered in mfg (A) 2,268 7,762 10,502 11,683
- Electronics (B) 469 3,407 4,969 6,303
Ratio (B/A, %) 20.7 43.9 47.3 54.0
R&D centers in industry (A) 183 966 1,435 1,980
- Electronics (B) 50 346 562 774
Ratio (B/A, %) 27.3 35.8 39.1 39.1
Source. The Bank of Korea, Electronic Industry Association of Korea
Unit. exports: million $; Value Added and R&D investments: billion won; employment and researchers:
thousand people (1993 data for R&D investments and number of researchers in 1994 column)
64 About 40 per cent of the government subsidies for R&D has been provided to the electronics industry
since the mid- 1980s.
65 In 1987 exports in electronics industry surpassed that of textiles industry, the leading sector since the
1960s.
The electronics industry also leads the research and development activities of the
Korean economy. Since 1985, the R&D investments in the electronics industry accounted
for more than 30 per cent of total R&D expenditures in the manufacturing industry. It
has also employed more than 30 per cent of research personnel working for manufacturing
industry. In the number of patents registered by the electronics industry was 469, only 20
per cent of the patents registered in manufacturing industry in 1985. The share rapidly
increased so that in 1994 it reached 54 per cent. In addition, the electronics industry
established 774 research centers by 1994, which accounts for 39 per cent of research
centers established by all industry.
Korean electronics industry's status in international trade also enhanced gradually.
The world market share of the Korea's electronics industry increased to 4.6 per cent in
1994 from 1.1 per cent in 1980. In the case of consumer electronics products, Korea's
market share was 9.8 per cent in 1994, which is the second largest after Japan. In
electronic components and parts, Korea's world market share was 8.2 per cent in 1994.
This is remarkable development in that in 1980 the share was only 2.2 per cent. The rapid
industrial development in components and parts area has been based on the successful
entry into semiconductor businesses during the early 1980s. In industrial electronic
products, however, the Korea's world market share was just 2.1 per cent in 1994 (Table
5-2). Considering that industrial electronic products are more technology-intensive, high
value-added, and having the largest market size in the electronics industry, the poor
performance of Korea this field represents that the Korea's electronics industry still lack
in technical capabilities.
TABLE 5-2: The World Market Share of Korea's Electronics Industry
(unit: one hundred million dollar)
1980 1994
Total C I C/P Total C I C/P
World Market (A) 2,615 383 1,610 622 7,289 726 4,502 2,601
KoreanProduction(B) 29 11 4 14 334 71 93 170
Ratio (B/A,%) 1.1 2.9 0.2 2.2 4.6 9.8 2.1 8.2
Source. Elsevier Advanced Technology, Electronic Industries Association of Korea
C: consumer electronics, I: industrial electronics, C/P: electronic components and parts
Korea's leading products in the electronics industry have evolved into more
technology-intensive areas gradually. From the assembly operation of radios or
semiconductors in the 1970s, the manufacturing of VCR, color CRT, and video tape
dominated the industry's development in the mid-1980s. Today, the manufacturing of
semiconductor memory chips, electronic telecommunication switching equipment,
camcorders, and CDP are emerging as new leaders leading the development of Korea's
electronics industry (Table 5-3).
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5.2.2 Export-oriented Development
Export-pushing is a major driving force of Korea's economic development. The
electronics industry has been a strategic sector for expanding Korea's exports. In 1975
when the subsidiaries of foreign firms still dominated Korea's exports in the electronics
industry, exports accounted for almost 80 per cent of total production. During the 1980s,
the period local electronic firms replaced the subsidiaries of foreign firms in the dominance
of exports, the export ratio still exceeded 60 per cent. In 1994, export ratio again
increased to 65 per cent due to the surge of semiconductor memory chip exports (Table 5-
4).
TABLE: 5-4: Export Ratio of the Electronics Industry
(unit: million $)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Production (A) 736 2,911 7,475 29,352 47,008
Exports (B) 582 2,105 4,532 17,658 30,953
Ratio (B/A, %) 79.1 72.3 60.6 60.2 65.8
Source. Electronic Industry Association of Korea
Electronic components and parts has led exports in the electronics industry. Of the
electronics industry's total exports, components and parts constitutes 57 per cent in 1994,
increasing from 38 per cent in 1985. However, the share of consumer electronics industry
in exports decreased from 42 per cent in 1985 to 24 per cent in 1994 while the share of
industrial electronics did not change much from 20 per cent (Table 5-5).
TABLE 5-5: Export Structure by Sectors
(unit: %)
1985 1988 1990 1994
Components & Parts 38 38 46 57
Consumer 42 41 33 24
Industrial 20 21 21 19
Source. Electronic Industry Association of Korea
However, the rapid expansion in the electronics industry's exports has been
accompanied by structural problems. It has been heavily relied on OEM-based exports so
that in 1993 about 40 per cent of color TVs, 55 per cent of VCRs, and 75 per cent of
microwave ovens were exported with OEM brand. Except for this, Korea still heavily
relied on imported key components for manufacturing export-leading products. This will
be discussed in detail next.
5.2.3 Domestic Firm-Oriented Development
During the early stage of industrial development in the 1960s and early 1970s, inward
direct foreign investment from the US firms like Motorola, Signetics, Fairchild
Semiconductors and Control Data and series of joint ventures between Japanese and local
firms played a major role in the development of the industry. The best indication of the
importance of foreign enterprises is the proportion of bonded processing of total
electronics exports in 1972, which amounted to 72 per cent (Table 5-6). However, the
US firms used Korea as an assembly basis, exploiting the low labor costs, while the
Japanese companies manufactured low-end electronic components which would export to
Japan. Therefore, both the US and Japanese firms held little connection with Korea's
domestic industry, and had little intention of shifting their Korean assembly base into more
technology-intensive sectors.
TABLE 5-6: Electronics Exports by Company Classification
Total Export Company Classification and Share of Exports (%)
(million $) Local Firms Joint Ventures Foreign Firms
1968 20 21 8 71
1972 142 29 17 55
1975 582 26 23 51
1978 1,359 39 18 43
1980 2,003 48 15 37
1985 4,780 66 12 22
1990 17,658 76 9 15
1991 19,788 79 12 9
Source. Korea Exchange Bank: Industry in Korea
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Since the mid-1970s the most significant feature of the industry has been the
progression of domestic firms in the export business, so that by 1980 they were handling
48 per cent of electronics exports. In 1990 local firms shared 76 per cent of electronics
exports. Local firms in the industry have accumulated experiences in product design and
production operations that provided a basis for limited indigenous efforts for the
assimilation of imported technology. Then, increased market competition in local and
international markets and increasing capability of local personnel together with
assimilation of foreign technology led to gradual improvement of foreign technology. This
transition from relying on inward FDI to domestic mastery of existing technology was
greatly facilitated by the transfer of skilled local staff from foreign-invested to domestically
owned firms. Most production executives commenced work for foreign firms and then
turned to domestic firms, bringing their skills with them.6 6 Local components and parts
manufacturers emerged in response to the local demands while four conglomerates in
Korea, Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, Daewoo, and Hyundai, aggressively expanded their
electronics businesses.
5.2.4 Conglomerate-dominated Development
The development of the electronics industry in Korea has also been dominated by the big
companies, especially the chaebol. In 1993 big companies which employed more than 300
workers accounted for 76 per cent of total sales volume in electronics industry, 77 per
66 See Michell (1988).
cent of value-added, while less than 3 per cent of company numbers and 55 per cent of
employment (Table 5-7).
TABLE 5-7: The Structure of Korea's Electronics Industry (1993)
(unit: billion won, %)
company employment production value-added
number share number share amount share amount share
Small&medium 4,933 97.4 142,663 44.1 7,749 23.4 3,156 22.6
(5-49) 4,244 72,266 2,725 1,282
(50-299) 689 70,397 5,024 1,874
Large (300-) 131 2.6 180,805 55.9 25,305 76.6 10,815 77.4
Total 5,064 100 323,468 100 32,054 100 13,971 100
Source. Bank of Korea, Statistics of Korean economy, various issues
However, of the large companies, many firms are the affiliates and subsidiaries of the
conglomerates, Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, Daewoo, and Hyundai. As shown in Table 5-
8, the top three companies, which are members of chaebol groups, accounted for 58 per
cent of Korea's total production of the electronics industry in 1990. And the share
increased to 65 per cent in 1993.
TABLE 5-8: The Concentration of Korea's Electronics Industry
(unit: billion won)
1990 1993




Subtotal (B) 12,625 21,406
Ratio (B/A, %) 58.1 65.2
Source. Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, Strategies for Korea's Electronics and
Information Industries towards 21st Century, 1995.
Furthermore, the conglomerates also dominated R&D activities. In 1992 the R&D
expenditures of top 5 electronics firms accounted for 74 per cent of total R&D
expenditures in electronics industry, top 10 companies, 86 per cent, and top 20 companies
92 per cent. These numbers are far larger compared with the situation in manufacturing
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industry: top 5 companies shared 30 per cent in total R&D investments in industry total,
and top 20 companies, 49 per cent. In the distribution of R&D personnel, top 5
companies possessed 56 per cent of total R&D work force in electronics industry, while
the ratio is just 28 per cent in industry total (Table 5-9).
TABLE 5-9: R&D Concentration on Large Firms (1992)
(unit: billion won, %)
Electronics Industry Industry total
R&D expenditures (A) 1,135 3,626
- top 5 (ratio:top5/A) 848 (74.7) 1,092 (30.1)
- top 10 (ratio:topl0/A) 986 (86.8) 1,417 (39.1)
- top 20 (ratio:top20/A) 1,044 (92.0) 1,804 (49.8)
No. of R&D personnel (A) 15,923 35,473
- top 5 (ratio:top5/A) 8,917 (56.0) 9,933 (28.0)
- top 10 (ratio:topl0/A) 10,391 (65.3) 12,378 (34.9)
- top 20 (ratio:top20/A) 11,730 (73.7) 15,284 (43.1)
Source. Korea Industrial Technology Association, Major Indicators of Industrial Technology,
1994.
5.2.5 Mass-Production-oriented Development
Since the Korea's electronics industry has been developed around large companies, its
major products have been concentrated on capital-intensive, mass-production sectors,
where financial capabilities to expand capacity rapidly to achieve substantial scale
economies and R&D capabilities to continuously carry out incremental improvement of
technology and product quality, are crucial.67 Indeed, the conglomerate organizational
mode, together with the large size of the individual firms which make up the
conglomerate, has provided lots of advantages in penetrating such sectors where entry
67 In this respect, Korean electronics industry's development procedure has been quite contrary to that of
Taiwan, where small and medium-sized firms have played a key role by exploiting worldwide niche
markets based on their flexible management, nimble decision-making, and sophisticated information
networks. However, recently, Taiwan's electronics industry is experiencing structural adjustments, being
more concentrated on several large firms, such as Tatung, Nan Ya, and Acer while Korea is trying to
promote small and medium size firms that have technical capacity to compete both internally and
externally.
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barriers are high and the uncertainty of new ventures is substantial. Consequently, as
shown in Table 5-10, the top 10 leading export-products locate in these capital-intensive,
mass production sectors, except for measuring equipment.
However, the mass-production oriented structure, together with conglomerate mode
organizational structure, exposes several problems. As the economies of scale and scope
become less and less important, as improved telecommunications lead to a large decline in
marketing and information gathering costs, and as capital markets become more and more
sophisticated, the advantages of Korean electronics industry based on big firms and mass-
production skills will be gradually reduced. Furthermore, the mass-production schemes
relying on several big firms has been easily exposed to advanced countries' import
restrictions. Almost all export leading products listed in Table 5-10 were involved in anti-
dumping or patent infringement suits in the United States and European Union markets.
Without complementing small and medium-size firms with technical competence and
marketing capability to exploit worldwide niche markets, it is difficult for Korea to further
the development of the electronics industry.
TABLE 5-10: Top 10 Export Leading Products (1994)
(unit: $ million, %)
Products Exports (share)
Semiconductors* 12,265 (39.6)
Computer Peripherals 2,856 (9.2)
Color TV 1,622 (5.2)
VCR 1,480 (4.8)
Color Picture Tube 900 (2.9)
Magnetic Tape 872 (2.8)
Microwave Oven 780 (2.5)
Cassette Recorder 757 (2.4)
Car Stereo 464 (1.5)
Measuring Equipment 381 (1.2)
Sub-total 22,377 (72.3)
Source. Electronic Industry Association of Korea, 1995
*most of semiconductors exported by Korea are memory chips which are sensitive to scale-economies and
mass-production capabilities. Korea has been weak in MPU/MCU or customized chip production which
requests sophisticated design capabilities.
102
5.2.6 Assembly-based Development
The Korea's electronics industry has heavily relied on imported components and parts.
The focus on assembly process was an inevitable and effective choice for Korea given that
it lacked in technical and financial capabilities to develop key components in parallel. It has
also gradually localized components and parts. For instance, about 90 per cent of
components is localized for color television manufacturing, and 70 per cent for VCR.
However, recently, as the Korean electronics industry entered into more technology-
intensive industries, and as the product life cycle became shorter, the situation as a whole
has not improved. As shown in Table 5-11, the import-dependency rate of electronic
components and parts is not improved below 55 per cent. Furthermore, the dependency
of general components except for semiconductors increased through the late 1980s and
1990s due to the rapid increase of key components imports.
This shows the late comer's disadvantages of chasing moving technical targets. At the
same time, it represents that Korea as a whole has failed to promote key components
industry which is critical to sustain the competitiveness of the electronics industry. For
instance, in terms of price, Korea still relied 50 per cent of components on imports in
camcorders, 35 per cent in CDP, and 30 per cent in high quality VCR. Custom
semiconductors, electro-optical components, and CCDs, and small size motors are key
components that Korea cannot localize.
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TABLE 5-11: Supply/Demand Structure of Electronic Components and Parts
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imported chips in 1988. Since the
export prices, exports exceeded the
5.2.7 Rapid Internationalization
Since the late 1980s, Korean electronics industry has rapidly internationalized. As Korea's
big-push of exports resulted in trade conflicts with advanced countries, especially the
United States and European Commissions, and consequently as those countries raised
trade barriers against Korea's electronic products, the Korean firms, especially the
conglomerates rapidly invested in those countries to sustain and to further market share in
those countries. At the same time, due to the rapid increase of real wages since the mid-
1980s, Korean electronics industry has lost its traditional comparative advantage of low
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labor costs against South East Asian countries, where labor costs are much lower while
Japanese electronic firms' investments provide the needed technologies for manufacturing
electronic products. In the face of this new challenge, Korean firms rapidly increased
investments in these countries to manufacturing low-end products. As a result, foreign
subsidiaries of Korean electronic firms increased to 661 in 1994 from 131 in 1989. In the
case of manufacturing subsidiaries, slightly more than 50 per cent of subsidiaries were
located in Asia, which represents that not only large firms but also small and medium-size
firms invested in those areas (Table 5-12).
TABLE 5-12: Number of Outward Foreign Direct Investment
- '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 Total
Total 131 74 67 76 116 197 661
For manufacturing 48 43 47 52 89 164 443
.Asia 26 31 39 40 69 142 347
.North America 6 5 5 6 10 18 50
.Europe 12 5 3 5 9 2 36
For Sales 78 24 18 21 24 28 193
.Asia 25 8 5 6 7 10 61
.North America 27 9 4 4 7 10 61
.Europe 19 6 8 10 8 4 55
For R&D 5 7 2 3 3 5 25
.Asia - 2 1 2 1 1 7
.North America 4 4 1 1 2 4 16
. Europe - 1 - - - - 1
Source. Electronic Industry Association of Korea
Consequently, the share of foreign production has been increased. In the case of color
TV sets, the share of foreign production in total production has increased from 19 per
cent in 1992 to 28 per cent in 1995. In VCR the share was 16 per cent, and 20 per cent
respectively at the same year.
At the same time Korean firms' outward FDI for acquiring the state-of-the-art
technologies and marketing assets has been also increased. This type of FDI is mainly
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concentrated on semiconductors and computers, and on the United States geographically.
Major cases are illustrated in Table 5-13.



















.Joint venture with Texas Instrument
.'94.8 operation beginning ($30million)
AST's Equity Silicon .40.24% of equity
acquisition Valley (USA)
Hyundai Acquisition of Silicon .100% acquisition ($150 million)
Maxter Valley (USA) .Hard-disk manufacturing/marketing
Acquisition of Colorado .100% acquisition ($340million) '95.2
AT&T/GIS (USA) .Non-memory semiconductors (MPU/MCU)
16M-DRAM Oregon .100% investment ($1.3 billion)
manufacturing (USA) .will begin construction in '96.
Goldstar Acquisition of .100% acquisition
Zenith .Flat screen TV technology/Brand reputation
Daewoo research center New Jersey .Development of Digital semiconductors for
establishment multimedia ($100 million)
5.3 Evaluation of the Technology Policy in the Electronics Industry
Until the mid-1980s, Korea's electronics industry had poor indigenous capability to
develop advanced technologies while it faced imminent need to upscale into high value-
added products. Under the circumstances, since the revenue base of the Korean




imperative that, to the extent feasible, Korea be highly selective in their choice of research
projects in an effort to maximize the effectiveness of the expenditures. In this respect, in
general, the government's technology policy for accelerating technical learning in the
electronics industry has targeted product modifications, development of commercial
technologies, and process development than the creation of new product design ideas and
basic research. Consequently, as shown in Chapter 4, together with other incentives such
as tax benefits and low interest loans for facilitating private firms' R&D efforts, the
government has intended to focus its R&D budget on small number of selected projects
carried out by limited number of firms. This can be reasonable choices given that the
Korean electronic firms in the mid-1980s did not so much stressed the importance of
developing their indigenous technical capability as they do now. Therefore, the
government needed to stimulate private firms' R&D efforts by selecting model-case
projects and firms. However, the problem is that this basic philosophy has not evolved
according to changing circumstances. It prevails in current government's decision-making
mechanisms and officials' minds as an undesirable inertia. Basically, the potential
problems of the technology policies for the electronics industry are the same as those
discussed in Section 4.2: inefficient administrative structure; poor development of higher
educational institutions; weakness of small and medium size firms' technical capabilities;
weakness in basic research capabilities; potential problems entailed in national R&D
projects. Detailed discussion of several issues in the case of the electronics industry may
suggest a yardstick to measure the adequacy of the government's technology policies.
The Korean government has potential problems in the administrative procedures for
selecting national R&D projects: conflicts among technology policy-related ministries;
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inefficient interministrial coordination mechanisms; and unclear criteria for selecting
projects; inefficient mechanisms for diffusing technical information among participants and
to third parties. The Very Large Scale Integrated Circuits (VLSI) project, which aims to
develop Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) semiconductor chips, represents the
problems well. The VLSI project have supported and will support the development of
five generations of DRAM product from 1986 to 1997. Of 460 billion won (about $6
hundred million) of total R&D expenditures, the government supports 40 per cent. The
government extended the project in 1993 to co-develop 256M DRAM and IG DRAM by
1995 and 1997 respectively. However, at that time, the Korean semiconductor industry
already had international competence in DRAM business. Samsung became the world's
largest provider of DRAM in 1994, surpassing the formidable Japanese semiconductor
manufacturers such as NEC, Toshiba, and Hitachi. The combined sales revenues of three
Korean semiconductor firms (Samsung, Goldstar, Hyundai) accounted for about 30 per
cent of the world DRAM market. Under this situation, the Korean semiconductor firms
seem to hold sufficient motivation and capability to carry out the R&D with their own
financial resources. Furthermore, ironically Goldstar made a contract with Hitachi in
1991 to cooperate in technical development and manufacturing of DRAM without any
connection with the national R&D project. Based on this contract, Goldstar imported
DRAM manufacturing technology from Hitachi. Samsung is now also seeking for
international partner to develop 256M DRAM. All these activities verified that, on the
one hand, the technology diffusion procedures of the national project has not been
sufficient to upscale the technical capability of local firms to even level. And on the
other hand, the government does not establish manifest mechanisms to integrate
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international R&D cooperation into its national projects. Given that the government had
lots of other policy goals, the survival of the VLSI project in 1993 implies the current
mechanisms for national R&D projects have some potential problems.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) launched the Mainframe Computer
Development project in 1994 while the Ministry of Communication was pursuing a similar
project. The four largest conglomerates (Samsung, Goldstar, Daewoo, Hyundai) are the
major participants, and therefore the major beneficiaries, of this project. The execution of
two duplicative projects with same firms throws a question that whether there is
interministerial level criteria to select national R&D projects. Rather than higher
government level decision rules, spontaneous negotiations and compromises among
relevant ministries seem to dominate the selection of the projects.
Furthermore, the government has executed HDTV and Cellular-phone
Communication System development projects.68 In both of the two projects, international
standardization threw a subtle but critical implication to successful execution of research.
As well known, the Japanese and European HDTV technologies, which had lead the
technical competitions based on the improvement of existing analog technologies, became
outmoded when the United States chose digital techniques as its standard for high-
definition televisions. Since the digital technology is more efficient than analog
technology in transmitting and processing signals and information, Japan and European
Union inevitably followed the digital techniques as its standard. In cellular phone systems
as technology evolved form analog to digital, there have been fierce competitions among
68 The HDTV project has been carried out from 1990 to 1993 under the government's R&D subsidy
provision with participation of three major consumer electronic firms, again Samsung, Goldstar, and
Daewoo. About $100 billion was invested in the project and the government provided 45 per cent of this
investment.
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the United States and European Union to dominate international standard based on its
own digital technology. In addition, a small US venture firm, Qualcom, suggested another
digital technology, CDMA, which is technically and conceptually more excellent than
existing TDMA digital technology. However, the CDMA technology has been
commercially unproved until now. In addition, international standard has not established
so far. Under the circumstances, the Korean government initiated the R&D projects in
both of these two fields. In 1993 Korea succeeded in developing HDTV prototype based
on digital technology, which, however, needs continuous technical improvements by
monitoring international trend of standardization. In cellular phone system, the MOC
launched CDMA-type system development project while later the MOC started a R&D
project to develop a TDMA-type hand-held telephone. All these projects were again
executed by the same four conglomerates (Samsung, Goldstar, Hyundai, and Daewoo).
If looking at just the projects themselves, all have their own rationale to justify their
presence in the government's national R&D projects. The four conglomerates still lacks in
international competence against US, European, and Japanese firms, which dominate
world markets and are very reluctant to transfer technologies to potential future
competitors like Korean electronic firms. However, if looking at the projects at the
highest level of government, the National R&D projects are exposing potential problems.
The point is that the Korean government needs to evaluate objectively whether it has clear
criteria at the highest level for selecting national R&D projects, whether it has not been
excessively exposed to the interjection of interest-group politics, especially from the
conglomerates, and whether the struggle among technology policy-related ministries has
somewhat distorted the decision-making process.
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The underdevelopment of higher educational institutions for training scientists and
engineers draws on one of a significant problem in furthering the development of the
electronics industry. As shown in Table 5-14, a survey conducted by a industry
association for the perspective of supply and demand structure of researchers in the
electronics industry suggests that Korea may face a serious researcher shortages,
especially in higher degrees: masters and Ph.D.69 However, there will be researcher
surplus with bachelor degree.
TABLE 5-14 Perspective on the Supply/Demand of Researchers in Electronics Industry
1994 1996 1998 2000
Bachelor Demand 8,315 8,686 9,132 9,913
Supply 9,834 10,009 10,149 10,203
Surplus +1,519 +1,383 +1,017 +290
Master Demand 3,296 3,484 3,831 4,653
Supply 2,445 2,474 2,505 2,114
Surplus -851 -1,010 -1,326 -2,539
Ph.D. Demand 752 831 1,136 1,274
Supply 617 669 762 834
Surplus -135 -162 -374 -440
Source. Information and Communication Industry Association of Korea, Computerized Society,
1995
Given that Koreans, in general, have strong preference for higher degrees , the
structure of surplus in bachelors and shortage in masters and Ph.D. implies that the current
university educational systems can not accommodate enough numbers of masters and
Ph.D. students that the industry needs. In this respect, Korean government's technology
policies during the 1980s and the early 1990s have failed in raising enough number of
researchers, one of the most fundamental and important policy agenda.
69 In this survey, software and telecommunications industry, together with electronics (hardware) industry,
were included.
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In responding to the "computerization wave", the deregulation/reregulation of relevant
legal systems for establishing new business environments is a crucial factor for upscaling
the electronics industry. Indeed, the refining of legal systems is a important policy
measure to establish and implement articulate technology policies. Therefore it must
interact with the technology policies. The rapidly progressing deregulation in
telecommunications, press media, and broadcasting in the United States represents the
importance of this task. However, the Korean government again faces a potential problem
and the problem again is stemmed from territorial struggle among relevant ministries. As
a less developing country, unconditional liberalization and deregulation are not always
desirable for the development of the Korea's electronics industry and the economy as well.
Given that the telecommunications, information, and even electronics industries are now
being dominated by a few number of huge multinationals from advanced economies,
gradual deregulation procedures can be more desirable for the Korean industries.
However, regardless of this fact, the current government structure does not well meet the
policy demands under new environments. The role is too fragmented and dispersed into
too many ministries. For instance, broadcasting and press media industries are under the
control of the Ministry of Information, while the Ministry of Communication is in charge
of telecommunications and data communications with unclear distinctions. In Addition,
the Ministry of Trade and Industry assumes the responsibility for promoting manufacturing
industry. Very often, the conflicts among those relevant ministries have resulted in time-




The Korean government's sector-specific industry policy during the 1960s and 1970s can
be said successful. During those days, since the Korean economy and the institutional
organizations were small in size and simple in structure, and since the industrial
development was the most important national goal with strong support and supervision
from the President, the strong government intervention under centralized economic
development plan could be effective and efficient. By contrast, the Korean government's
technology policy has been developed and implemented under different circumstances.
During the 1980s, the sophisticated structure of the Korean economy did not request
excessive government interventions. In this regard, the government faced a potential
problem in establishing centralized technology policies in that time. However, even
though the government, at the macroeconomic policy level, pronounced liberalization,
deregulation, decentralization, and internationalization as basic policy directions, the past
centralized and domestic-oriented culture has dominated planning of microscopic
technology policies. As a result, rather than policy tasks for strengthening the
technological infrastructure (facilitating technology diffusion based on decentralized plan),
selecting strategic technological projects and focusing limited budgets on those projects
(picking winners based on centralized plan) has been the major shape of the Korean
government's technology policies during the 1980s. As pointed out before, those
selective policy could be desirable since the Korean government's budget base was much
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smaller than that of advanced countries, and since the government needed to be more
selective in its choice of projects. Yet the absence of powerful coordinating agency to
orchestrate a nationwide technology policy together with the too excessive territorial
conflicts among technology policy-related ministries have prohibited the government from
establishing and implementing optimal policies. Under the circumstances, the execution of
other policy tasks (such as the establishment of higher educational systems for raising
qualified engineers and scientists and the construction of technical infrastructure where
small and medium size firms' technological capabilities could be built on) have been
delayed. In this regard, the Korean government's technology policy during the last 15
years can be judged as continuous failures not to meet the substantial, but tacit demands
for correcting the structural problems in Korea's technological environments. The Korean
government now needs to reconsider the goals, tools, and mechanisms of technology
policy .
First, Korea needs to reorganize the administrative process for technology policies.
Most importantly, at the highest level of government, the establishment of a powerful
coordinating agency is requested. The agency needs to hold explicit policy measures to
enforce the technology policy-related ministries to cooperate. The agency also needs to
establish more rational decision-making criteria and rules to prioritize research projects. It
also needs to establish a mechanism through which technology policies are integrated into
other national plans such as economic, educational, and environmental programs. To
carry out this task, it needs to set-up a high profile committee constituted by ministers in
charge of government budgets, finance and tax systems, education, science, industry,
communications, and defense.
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Second, Korea needs to promote the research capabilities of higher educational
institutions. As described in Chapter 2, the sufficient provision of highly educated
engineers and scientists constituted one of the most crucial factors for Germany and the
United States to catch-up with Britain in the early twentieth century. Today's negligence
of this task will compromise the future progress of Korea's industrial development.
Third, as for the big national projects, Korea needs to establish more rational decision-
making rules for selecting projects to avoid the government failure due to the influence of
small number of politically more powerful clients. Given the limited budgetary capability
of the Korean government, if it is difficult to rationalize the administrative procedures
under the current system, it is more desirable to shift the funds for the national projects
into the programs for promoting technical infrastructure so that the benefits are shared
more widely and fairly. In addition, given the limited technical capabilities of Korea, it is
impossible to achieve technical competitiveness in almost all high-technology industries
such as semiconductors, new energy sectors, biotechnology, aerospace, and
telecommunications as aimed by the HAN project. Therefore, Korea needs to narrow the
scope of the national projects
Fourth, with regard to basic science research, the Korean government need not to hurry
to strengthen relevant policies. The benefits of basic science usually come in a indirect way
and are not totally appropriable by a country to invest. In this respect, even the advanced
countries like the United States tends to minimize the expenditures in basic science. In
addition, as shown in the industrialization of the United States in the late nineteenth
century, the enhancement of scientific capabilities often lags the industrial development
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and technological advances. Given the limited budgetary base of the Korean government,
it may be inevitable to minimize the resource allocation in basic science research.
Fifth, As for the enhancement of small and medium size firms' technological
capabilities, rather than selective subsidizing of R&D funds to small number of firms, other
policy measures like education and training, the supply of researchers, and the provision of
market and technological information, are more desirable. A low interest rates loans can
substitute the R&D subsidies for selective research projects.
Sixth, the government needs to minimize the arbitrary encouragement of collaborative
research among rival firms. As long as the goal of the research is closely related to
commercialization, which is an inevitable choice for Korea for the time being, the past
experience has proved the deficiencies of this system. Under the current circumstances,
Korean firms have enough motivation to collaborate with rival firms for developing
commercial technologies without the government's coordination and financial supports,
whether they are large, medium, or small firms.
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